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ABSTRACT 
While institutional analysts have made strides in understanding industry 
emergence, we know little about why some nascent industries do not emerge. 
This study investigates what inhibits industry emergence and how. 
Drawing on the Cape Wind project (2001-2014), America's first offshore 
wind energy project proposal, this study shows that a systemic interplay of 
regulatory, social, technological, economic, and political factors delayed project 
development and inhibited industry emergence. The regulatory regime and the 
public were disengaged in their attention, interest, and values during and 
beyond the permitting process. While regulators focused on scientific issues 
requiring stable problem-solving methods, the public focused on social justice 
issues requiring emergent methods. The structural disengagement left the project 
in a quagmire of contestation despite regulatory success. 
vii 
This study contributes to economic sociology by identifying the factors 
and mechanisms that inhibit industry emergence. It enriches institutional studies 
by demonstrating the duality of structure and values in enabling actions and 
inducing outcomes. It contributes to innovation studies by integrating structure 
with content through a typology of four kinds of innovation. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This study investigates what inhibits industry emergence and how. The 
original motivation for this study was the empirical puzzle that, while some new 
industries had successfully emerged and grown (e.g. the computer industry, the 
smartphone industry), emergence and development of other new industries had 
not been as successful, even when macro socioeconomic conditions appeared to 
be conducive (e.g. renewable energy industry in the United States). 
Traditional economic sociology had largely been silent on industry 
emergence. The existence of an industry was often conceptualized as part of the 
assumptions and was study on an ex post basis. Recent development along the 
institutional lens have sought to unpack this "black box" and has made strides in 
revealing how nascent industries emerge and mature. With its key tenets in 
macro social cognition, institutional theorists pointed out that institutional, 
cultural innovations lead to shifts in cognition of frames, codes, and meanings. 
Such changes may alter the economic conditions that lead to new entrepreneurial 
opportunities and new industry development. 
However, we still know little about why some nascent industries do not 
1 
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emerge. What are the factors and mechanisms that would inhibit the rise of a 
nascent industry? In particular, how these sources of resistance would exert their 
influences at the very early stage of development for a new industry? In this 
study, I start to address these this question. 
I draw on the case of the Cape Wind project, the first offshore wind 
energy project proposed in the United States. This project was proposed in 2001 
to construct America's first offshore wind energy facility in Nantucket Sound, 
Massachusetts. It went through a difficult 10-year regulatory process before 
securing the necessary regulatory permits but still faced challenges on 
technological, economic, social, and political fronts. As of mid-2014, Cape Wind's 
construction has not begun. No other offshore wind farm is in operation or 
construction in the United States as well. 
As the first of its kind, this project provided an effective empirical context 
for studying what sources of resistance may inhibit industry emergence. 
Through the lenses of this first project of the first firm in a potential industry, a 
project-level study would be best positioned to shed light on the detailed 
processes that underlie industry-level dynamics. Cape Wind was a microcosm 
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that connects a project with an industry, marrying a local concern with a regional, 
national agenda. 
This study shows that a systemic interplay of regulatory, social, 
technological, economic, and political factors may delay the development of a 
nascent industry project and inhibit a nascent industry at large. In particular, the 
regulatory barrier caused a long permitting lead-time and significantly increased 
the uncertainty and impact of the social, technological, economic, and political 
risks. The regulatory regime and the public diverged in their focus on problem-
solving values and structures. While the regulators focused on scientific issues 
requiring stable problem-solving structures, the public focused on social justice 
issues requiring emergent problem-solving structures. The regulatory . regime 
was not equipped with the structural geanng to effectively address all the 
public's issues of concern. This structural disengagement left Cape Wind, the 
first project of a nascent industry, in a quagmire .of social contestation despite 
regulatory success. 
This study contributes to economic sociology by starting to reveal the 
factors and mechanisms that would inhibit, delay, or prevent nascent industries 
from emerging. Anchored on a project-level case in a highly regulated setting, 
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this case reveals that, among a systemic interplay of factors, the regulatory 
barrier may amplify the uncertainty and risks that delays project development 
and inhibits industry emergence. 
This study enriches the current institutional studies by emphasizing the 
duality of values and structures in problem solving. It argues that structure 
conditions and enables action and provides the link between values and 
outcomes. The structural misalignment between regulators and the public 
exemplifies how the right combination of values and structures is required for 
effective issue resolution. Based on a conceptual framework of values and 
structures, this study identified four types of issues as sources of resistance to 
industry emergence. I then propose four types of innovation as strategies to 
overcome these four types of issues. 
This study also informs policymakers and entrepreneurs. Based on the 
discussion of issues and strategies for resolving them, this study makes 
recommendations to policymakers and entrepreneurs in how to anticipate 
resistance and strategize actions in order to develop and nurture a nascent 
industry. 
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The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I briefly 
review the extant literature, identify gaps, and articulate the research question. In 
Chapter 3, I discuss the research design and methodological strategies. In 
Chapter 4, I present the empirical findings in two part: Part 1 provides a three-
phase longitudinal account of the Cape Wind project; Part 2 focuses on the 
evolution of issues in the permitting process. Chapter 5 theorizes the findings 
and discusses the contributions to academia and practice. It also reflects on 
limitations and pinpoints directions for future studies. Chapter 6 concludes the 
dissertation by summarizing the main theme of the study. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, I briefly revisit the literature on industry emergence and 
identify gaps. I first discuss traditional economic, sociological, and innovation 
perspectives, followed by a review of recent developments from an institutional 
perspective. Based on these reviews, I will discuss the substantive as well as 
theoretical gaps in the current literature on industry emergence. I conclude this 
chapter by articulating the research question. 
2.1 Traditional Economic and Sociological Perspectives 
Why and how new industries emerge is one of the most fundamental 
questions in management research. Industry, as a key level of analysis, plays an 
essential constitutive role in the fabric of economic society. Despite its apparent 
importance, how industries emerge has been poorly understood. While scholars 
study organizations, firms, and industries, one question that often remains 
unasked is Where does an industry come from? 
Traditional economic perspectives are mostly silent on industry 
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emergence. For example, industry emergence was often conceptualized as part of 
a lifecycle image, an initial stage characterized with a small number of producers 
and limited product diffusion (Gort & Klepper, 1982; Klepper, 1997). 
Entrepreneurship studies from an evolutionary economics angle focused on how 
opportunities are discovered and exploited (Schumpeter 1934; Shane & 
Venkataraman 2000; Sorenson & Stuart 2008). These economic perspectives 
tended to assume the existence of the industry and conducted studies on an ex 
poste basis. They did not elaborate on how the necessary market and 
institutional conditions came into being prior to a nascent industry's initial 
market entry. 
Traditional sociological perspectives considered the question of industry 
emergence more directly but did not provide details on the processes. For 
example, population ecologists pointed out that the form and function of an 
emerging industry was subject to its historical and institutional contexts. Nascent 
business forms was found to bear the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). 
The success of industry emergence was conceptualized in an evolutionary image, 
where survival and retention were result of environmental selection (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1965). However, how and why the selection took place and what 
processes underlay the selection remained unanswered. New industries were 
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also found to require cognitive and sociopolitical legitimacy to secure the 
necessary resources for survival (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). However, the detailed 
processes by which a nascent industry acquired these resources were poorly 
understood. In summary, traditional sociological perspectives had focused on 
macro-structures, outcomes, and conditions, but were silent on processes and 
actions through which the initial attempts of a nascent industry interacted with 
its environment in order to survive, emerge, and grow. 
2.2. Innovation Perspectives 
Two streams of research on innovation were relevant to industry 
emergence but neither provided a satisfactory account. The first group focused 
· on technological innovation in a dominant design image (Anderson & Tushman, 
1990). The overall theme was that multiple technological options competed for 
dominance during the early stage of development for a particular technology. 
Once a dominant design was selected by the environment, the rate of innovation 
slowed down, innovation tended to become more modular and moved to the 
process level, and the associated industry started to mature and stable. This 
stream helped unpack the processes how technological innovations emerge and 
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mature and how technology mirrored with industry development. However, the 
locus of study was primarily on technology; the span of study was often across a 
long period of time; the research method was mostly quantitative and statistical. 
We still know little about the processes that take place at time zero, nor we know 
much about the roles that other, non-technological, non-market factors played in 
inducing or inhibiting industry emergence. 
The second stream of innovation studies came from the tradition of social 
construction of technology. These studies provided rich accounts of how a new 
technology, and the associated social practice, emerges but did not focus 
explicitly on industry emergence. Technological innovation was found to invoke 
divergent interpretations by its relevant interest groups (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 
1987). A standard was selected out of its competing options through interactions 
of individual- and social-level cognition. (Garud & Rappa, 1994). Though these 
studies helped reveal how the technological choice of a given nascent industry is 
developed and chosen, the locus of study was on technology. It only provided 
limited insight into why and how some nascent industries emerge while others 
do not. 
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2.3. Recent Institutional Perspectives 
Recent developments in institutional studies have made strides in 
understanding how nascent industries emerge. With its key tenants in social 
cognition and legitimation, institutional perspectives share the overarching 
theme that institutional, cultural innovations lead to changes in entrepreneurial 
conditions, which in turn induce opportunities for industry emergence and 
growth. For example, social movement was found to alter cognition of linguistic 
frames, leading to new entrepreneurial opportunities for industry emergence. 
For example, in a case study on the emergence of the recycling industry, 
Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch (2003) combined social movement and 
socioeconomic perspectives and demonstrated how social movement may alter 
existing field frames or institutional conditions and create new practice models 
that led to industry emergence. In a similar vein, Weber, Heinze, & DeSoucey 
(2008) demonstrated, through the rise of grass-fed meat and dairy industry, that 
social movement helps induce industry emergence by mobilizing cultural codes. 
The mobilization of these cultural codes enabled entrepreneurial production, 
creation of a collective producer identity, and establishment of producer-
consumer relationships. Based a study on the rise of U.S. wind energy industry, 
Sine and Lee (2009) also found large-scale social movement constructs cognitive 
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frameworks, norms, and values that in turn influence the creation of new market 
conditions and entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Other mechanisms are also found to link institutional innovation with 
industry emergence. In a study based on the satellite radio industry, Navis and 
Glynn (2010) proposed the notion of "market category legitimacy threshold". 
They demonstrated that the initial legitimation of new market category 
precipitates shifts in entrepreneurs' attention from legitimating the industry as a 
whole to creating firm-level differentiation, signaling the progression to industry 
maturity. In a recent study based on the nanotechnology industry, Grodal (2014) 
showed how the dynamics of core and peripheral communities in an emerging 
industry construct, shape, and contest the boundaries of social identity as well as 
the associated monetary and cultural resources. 
In summary, shifts in institutional arrangement, through construction and 
legitimation of identities, values, and norms, may alter the socioeconomic 
conditions in the market, in terms of entrepreneurial opportunities and resource 
access, which in turn induce the emergence and progression of nascent industries. 
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2.4 Substantive and Theoretical Gaps 
Despite the progress institutional analysts have made in understanding 
industry emergence, we still do not know much about why and how some 
industries struggle with emergence. Substantively, the extant literature drew 
mostly from on success stories but did not examine the other potential industries 
that had failed to emerge or their emergence is delayed. We do not know what 
sources of resistance and what blocking mechanisms that constitute the barrier to 
emergence. Without an understanding of what inhibits industry emergence, the 
study on the rise of nascent industries is incomplete and unbalanced. 
In addition, the theoretical lenses in the extant institutional studies on 
industry emergence have largely focused on social cognition in the forms of 
symbolic identities, values, and norms. While the empirical attention was on 
tracing codes, frames, and meanings, the literature has not elaborated on the 
structures and actions that link social cognition with socioeconomic outcomes. 
We do not know what actions take place that translate the shifts in social 
cognition into new market and social conditions. 
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2.5 Research Question 
In this study, I seek to address these substantive and theoretical gaps. I 
thereby formulate the research question as: 
What inhibits industry emergence and how? 
This research question entails two research objectives. The first objective is 
to discover, identify, and understand the factors that constitute the barrier to 
industry emergence. This is to address the substantive gap in the literature on 
those industries that do not emerge. In order to better understand industry 
emergence, we need to identify the sources of resistance and tease out how these 
factors may interact with each other in a way that hinders the rise of nascent 
industries. This objective requires a negative and multifaceted empirical context. 
The second research objective to identify and understand the mechanism 
that enabled those sources of resistance to inhibit industry emergence. This is to 
address the theoretical gap in our understanding of the linkage between social 
cognition and socioeconomic outcomes. What are the enabling structures and 
conditions and what social action those structures enable and constrain that lead 
to the socioeconomic outcomes? This research objective requires a rich, 
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longitudinal empirical context that would enable the researcher to observe the 
processes in detail and compare variations in outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the methodological approach. I first introduce the 
chosen research site and explain why it is a suitable empirical context for the 
research question. Then I introduce dafa sources, data collection and analytic 
designs. 
3.1 Theoretical Positioning and Industry-Project Levels of Analysis 
This study is positioned as exploratory in nature and seeks to generate 
new theoretical insight rather than to test hypotheses (Edmondson & McManus, 
2007). This study is inductive and qualitative, grounded in an in-depth case 
study. 
To study what inhibits industry emergence and why requires extreme 
sampling of cases (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). A suitable research context 
should be ideally able to capture a potential industry that struggles with 
emergence in its infancy. The research context should be rich enough so that 
broad kinds of factors may be examined for its influence on this particular 
15 
industry. Such factors may ideally include a combination of technological, 
economic, social, and regulatory dimensions. It should be a negative case where 
an entrepreneur has faced resistance to the initial attempt at market entry and 
the potentially industry has struggled with formation. Such a negative example 
would shed light on the factors and mechanisms that that inhibits industry 
emergence at time zero. 
A project-level case would be best suited for answering the research 
question. As discussed, prior studies had mostly focused on industry level of 
analysis. This may have entailed a longer time period under study and the use of 
mainly quantitative methods. However, such longitudinal industry analyses 
were often at the expenses of missing the detailed processes and actions that took 
place at the project and firm levels. The first project is the first attempt for the 
industry to make market entry. Initial industry emergence occurs or fails through 
the success or failure of its first firm's first project. A negative project-level case 
study is in a valuable position to capture and explain the resistance the project 
faces when the industry seeks its initial entry. 
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3.2 Site selection and justification 
I selected the Cape Wind project as an extreme case study to answer the 
research question. As the first offshore wind energy project proposed in the 
United States, Cape Wind was a poster-child example of a nascent industry 
failing to emerge. It went through a difficult 13-year period (2001-2014) of project 
development and yet has still not materialized. This project is a live, negative 
example that illustrates, through the vicissitudes of its first attempt at market 
entry, how a potential nascent industry could be inhibited by a systemic 
interplay of regulatory, technological, social, economic, and political factors. As 
the first of its kind, the case study on Cape Wind is able to capture the thwarted 
industry emergence in rich details at time zero. 
Offshore wind energy technology, as a type of renewable energy, is a new 
approach to generating energy. It collects wind-based kinetic energy on the 
ocean, converts it to electricity via a rotor, and transmits it into the existing grid 
system. This is different from the traditional fossil fuel-based power generation, 
in which energy resources (e.g. coal, oil, or gas) are extracted, refined, stored, 
transported to a centralized facility, and consumed as fuel for power production. 
For fossil fuel, the extraction and energy production can be temporally and 
17 
geographically separated. This gives fossil fuel-fired production relatively high 
flexibility in siting producing facilities. 
In contrast, current renewable energy technologies are limited in their 
siting options. First, renewable energy production tends to require a much larger 
geographical area to operate then do fossil fuel-fired facilities. For wind or solar 
energy, there is no fuel to store and transport. Collection and production must 
take place simultaneously. The energy sources (e.g. wind) are disbursed over a 
large geographical area. The goal of the technology is to capture these resources 
and convert them into electricity at the moment of collection. This collection-
production mode of operation is fundamentally different from the fuel-based 
philosophy where energy sources can be burned at a concentrated, pre-defined 
location. 
Second, renewable energy facilities tend to be sited closer to locations of 
consumption (e.g. residents, businesses). The output capacity per device (e.g. a 
wind turbine) tends to be very small. To better economize on the output, the 
siting of renewable energy projects is to balance between availability of energy 
sources (e.g. high wind) and proximity to demand. This restricts siting options 
18 
and often results in renewable energy devices sited close to, and thus visible to, 
residential communities and urban areas. 
Third, the siting of renewable energy projects needs to respect current 
transmission infrastructure. Though the mode of production is new, renewable 
energy relies on the existing grid system for transmission and delivery. The 
distributed nature of energy sources and the low output per device means that it 
often, for many projects, does not justify construction of new, large-scale 
transmission lines. This requires choosing a site in reasonable proximity of 
existing connections. 
In addition to siting challenges, renewable energy is required to respect 
the technological and economic standards for electricity generation and 
distribution at large. The product itself is electricity, a commodity whose 
technical standards and pricing models have long been established. The novelty 
of renewable energy is in its mode of production, but not in its product. It needs 
to be plugged into an existing system of technical and business operations. The 
existing power system was built over a century of developments in technology, 
business, and regulations around fossil fuel-fired production. How the new 
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renewable energy would interface with this old system and how they may co-
evolve is an open question. 
The Cape Wind project, as the first offshore wind energy project proposal, 
is an extreme case for studying what inhibits industry emergence. The project 
was to build 130 wind turbines in the waters of Nantucket Sound, Massachusetts. 
The project was initially proposed in 2001, went through a difficult 10-year 
permitting process, and, as of 2014, has not begun construction. In its total 13 
years of development, the project was met with every obstacle along the way. On 
the regulatory front, the project triggered legal change. The regulatory conditions 
co-evolved with the project, shifting from an industry-specific void to rule-
making to the final establishment of an industry-specific framework. On the 
social front, the project invoked wide controversy, ranging from impact on 
fisheries to ocean view, from climate change to local Native American culture. It 
spurred social movement activities: new advocacy groups were mobilized and 
competing coalitions formed. Communities were split in opinion. The project 
also faced challenges in aging technologies, shifting market conditions, and 
difficult investor and buyer relations. A bestseller book was written on the 
project and a documentary film was made. The project was often featured in 
local and national media. Yet, after 13 years, the project, and the offshore wind 
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energy industry at large, has so far failed to emerge. All these rich, multi-faceted 
elements make Cape Wind an ideal empirical theatre to study what factors 
inhibit a nascent industry from emerging and how. 
Though Cape Wind is a project-level context, it offers an opportunity to 
study resistances a potential industry faces when making its first attempt at 
market entry. Uniquely positioned as the first firm's first project, Cape Wind is a 
microcosm that reveals the detailed processes and actions that social players 
undertook in order to advance or resist this entry attempt. In this sense, the 
project-level development coincided with, and reflected, industry-level 
development. It could shed light on the processes · of this initial stage that would 
otherwise be missed in a more macro, industrial-level study. 
3.3 Data Collection and Analytical Approaches 
Because of Cape Wind's high publicity, the potential pool of empirical 
data was vast and diverse. To address the research question, I chose to focus on 
the data directly associated with the primary federal permitting process. This 
choice was made on the ground that the primary federal permit was the 
prevailing indicator of project progress. It bore the most significant impact on 
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project development and constituted the most direct barrier to entry. I was also 
cognizant of the data sources closely related to, thus helping to contextualize, 
this permitting process. 
The dataset consists of government archives, newspaper reports, 
interviews, and field observations. The primary data source came from 
government archives in the public domain. I collected the three versions (2004, 
2008, 2009) of the lead federal regulators' Environmental Impact Statements (EIS), 
published by the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and, subsequently, the 
Department of the Interior (DOl). Under the National Environmental Protection 
Act (NEP A), the federal regulator in charge of permitting a major construction 
project is to lead the environmental impact assessment and issue an 
Environmental Impact Statement. The EIS as a practice started off as catering to 
primarily environmental concerns but evolved later to include socioeconomic 
considerations. The scope of the EIS was specified through public hearings and 
consultations. The lead regulator would then compile and publish an EIS and 
used it as the primary basis for informing and justifying permitting decisions. An 
EIS included the regulator's assessment of the issues raised in initial scoping 
consultations and gave an impact rating on each issue. A draft EIS would be 
made available to the public for comments through hearings and written 
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submissions. The regulator evaluates the comments and issues a final EIS. The 
regulator would then have the discretion to approve or deny the project based on 
the principle of public interest. 
For Cape W'ind, the USACE was the lead federal regulator from 2001 to 
2005. The 2005 amendment to the Environmental Protection Act (EPA) 
transferred the , lead jurisdiction to the Mineral Management Service (MMS), 
under the Department of the Interior (DOl), which served as the lead regulator 
thereafter. In total, three versions of the EIS were published and three sets of 
hearings were held correspondingly: The USACE led the initial scoping hearing 
in 2002, published a draft EIS in 2004, conducted a second set of hearings for 
public comment on the draft EIS. After the 2005 change of jurisdiction, the DOl 
published another draft EIS in 2008, conducted a third set of hearings for public 
comment, and published the final EIS in 2009. All comments made at hearings 
were transcribed verbatim instantaneously by a professional scribe and made 
available in the public domain. After the issuance of the final EIS, the DOl made 
a decision of approval in 2010. See Table 3.1 for a high-level view of the key 
permitting milestones. 
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Time Selected Key Permitting Milestones 
Nov 2011 
Cape Wind Associates (CW A) filed project application with 
USACE. 
Mar-Apr USACE conducted public scoping hearings at Boston, West 
2002 Yarmouth, and Edgartown. 
Nov 2004 USACE published Draft EIS for public review and comment. 
Dec2004 USACE conducted public hearings at Martha's Vineyard, West Yarmouth, Nantucket, and Cambridge. 
Aug 2005 Energy Policy Act of 2005 & Amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) were signed off. 
Oct 2005 MMS of DOl took over lead authority from USACE. 
Jan 2008 DOl published Draft EIS. 
Mar 2008 DOl conducted public hearings at West Yarmouth, Nantucket, 
Edgartown, and Boston. 
Jan 2009 DOl published Final EIS. 
Apr 2010 DOl approved Cape Wind. 
Jan 2011 All permits granted 
Table 3.1 Timeline of Selected Key Permitting Milestones 
I collected the complete texts of the three versions of the EIS. I also 
collected the complete transcripts (2,803 pages) of three sets of federal public 
hearings (held in 2002, 2004, and 2008) associated with the three versions of the 
EIS. With the help of a research assistant, I extracted references from the three 
versions of EIS and built a database of 1,061 scientific citations that appeared in 
sections that discussed project impacts. I also examined 301 news articles 
published between 2002 and 2010, the time frame of the primary permitting 
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process. I conducted five site visits and held five formal and informal interviews 
to inform the archival analysis. 
A key unit of analysis was the issue. An issue was a topic on a domain of 
life that could potentially be affected by the project proposal in some way. An 
issue could be related to a natural system of life (e.g. birds, marine mammals), or 
socioeconomic life (e.g. jobs, fisheries, tourism), or a technical system (e.g. 
aviation, radar). The potential impact could be positive or negative. An issue 
represented a particular vantage point from which an individual might define, 
predict, and evaluate the merits and risks of the project. An individual's interest 
in an issue represented a concern to which the individual deemed relevant. 
Within the collected dataset, I analyzed the issues primarily from three 
types of data: regulators' issue impact ratings, the scientific citations that 
regulators used for evaluating issues, and the issues as discussed in public 
hearings. Next I explain my empirical strategies for each type. 
First, regulators' issue impact ratings were published m the 
Environmental Impact Statement. Impact ratings capture the information of what 
issues were included, how issues were categorized, and how issues were 
assessed. The two lead federal regulators, the USACE and the DOl, used similar 
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but different schemes for categorizing issues and scoring impact. I reconciled the 
issue categories across the three versions of the EIS, using the final DOl's version 
as the standard. This was because the final version was conceivably the most 
developed and comprehensive one. I then reconciled the impact scores. The 
USACE and DOl both used a 5-increment qualitative scale to measure issue 
impact. Depending on how the project might affect a certain issue, the potential 
impact was rated as none, negligible, minor, moderate, or major. The more severe the 
impact, the less favorable the assessment. The USACE also used verbal 
assessment in lieu of the 5-increment scale for some issues. In that case, the 
verbal assessment was matched with its closest score on the 5-increment scale. In 
order to better capture how ratings changed over time, I converted the USACE 
and DOl's scoring schemes into a 0-4 scale with 0.5 increment, 0 corresponding 
to none and 4 to major. Between the three versions of the EIS, if the scores for a 
particular issue changed by 1 or more, it is coded as Significant Change. If the 
change was by 0.5, it was coded as Borderline Change. If no change was observed, 
it as coded as No Change. 
Second, I built a database of the scientific references that regulators cited 
when evaluating issues in the EIS. The data on citations captures what 
information the regulators used for supporting their evaluation and justifying 
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the impact ratings g1ven. This database was built by extracting reference 
information from the sections in the EIS that discussed the issues under 
evaluation. The following information was captured in the database: issue name, 
filer (i.e. the party filing the document with the regulator), filer type (e.g. the 
developer, government agency, etc.), author, year of publication, title, type of study 
(i.e. an original project-specific study or generic literature), number of pages in case 
of an original study, source of funding for the study if published, amount of funds 
spent if published, time of the actual study, and the paper's position on the project (i.e. 
for or against or neutral) if any. 
Third, I qualitatively coded the complete verbatim transcripts of the 
federal public hearings associated with the three versions of the EIS. I followed 
the principle of open-coding (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) with the aid of the software 
Atlas.Ti. The coding was to identify what issues were raised in hearings, what 
positions participants took over issues, and how participants' positons evolved 
overtime. Each code corresponded to an issue, a domain of life that participants 
deemed relevant and to be potentially affected by the project. A participant cited 
an issue to question, promote, or oppose the project. A participant might also cite 
an issue to counter other comments on the same issue. For example, one could 
cite the turbines' negative visual impact while participants could refute that 
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argument and/or express an opposite view (e.g. the impact would be positive 
instead). I was also attentive to how the participants engaged the hearing process 
as intended by logging whether the EIS was mentioned in the comment. As the 
primary objective of the 2004 and 2008 hearings was for the public to comment 
on the draft EIS, whether a participant mentioned it was a proxy to gauge the 
public's participation as intended. 
The following dimensions of information were captured: Participant Name, 
Participant's Position on Project (Neutral, For, or Against), Participant's Affiliation 
Status (affiliated or independent), Participant's Organization (if affiliated), Whether 
Spoken in Official Capacity (if affiliated), Issue Being Cited, and Predicted Impact per 
Issue (Neutral, Positive, or Negative). No distinction was made between the 
multiple sessions within the same set of hearings. The eleven sessions were 
consolidated into three sets across the years of 2002, 2004, and 2008. If the same 
individual participated in multiple sessions within the same set, they are 
consolidated as one participatory instance. 
28 
CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Of the 5,000 miles approximately of coastline m the United States, why 
Nantucket Sound? 
--Michael O'Keefe, District Attorney, Cape & Islands, Massachusetts 
2004 Federal Hearing 
This chapter presents the empirical findings in two sections. The first 
section is a longitudinal account of Cape Wind's natural history. The second 
section is a cross-sectional study on issues central to the project's permitting 
process. In the first section, Cape Wind's history is narrated in three stages, 
corresponding to the three distinct regulatory contexts. In the first stage, the 
project went through a regulatory void and relevant stakeholders acted without 
any industry-specific framework. In the second stage was an interim stage: 
industry-specific laws were in place but operational rules were being made. The 
stakeholders acted in a shifting regulatory context. In the third stage, regulations 
were fully in place and the stakeholders started to operate within an industry-
specific framework. 
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The second section examines issues of interest in detail with focus on their 
evolution during the permitting process. I will compare how the public and 
regulators diverged in their attention as to what kinds of issues were more 
relevant. The public focused more on social justice issues requiring emergent 
problem-solving mechanism whereas the regulators focused more on scientific 
issues requiring stable methods. This structural disconnect gave rise to persistent 
social resistance to the project, despite its regulatory success. 
4.1 Three Stages of Development of Cape Wind's Natural History 
Cape Wind's 13-year development, from its conception in 2001 to the 
writing of this dissertation in 2014, could be viewed in three stages in light of 
three distinct regulatory conditions. Its 13-year natural history progressed in an 
evolving regulatory context, shifting from a regulatory void to an interim period 
of rule-making to an eventual industry-specific framework in place. The decade-
long permitting process of this single project co-evolved with the government's 
efforts to regulate ocean-based, alternative energy development. The regulatory 
factor was a major market barrier for the project to demonstrate its technological 
or economic potential, be it positive or negative. To a significant extent, the 
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project, as the first precedent, bore the costs, in resources spent and opportunities 
lost, for institution-building of a wider, industry scale. Nonetheless, despite 
industry-specific regulation and the project's permitting success, contestation 
persisted, issues remained, and the project was still far from the developer's 
original vision. 
An event timeline is found in Figure 4.1 to guide the narration of Cape 
Wind's history. The timeline organizes events by five key types of events: the 
"developer's action", the "regulator's action", "project-specific, extra-regulatory 
events" (i.e. those events that took place outside the formal regulatory process), 
"legal, regulatory context", and "other key events". 
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4.1.1. Stage 1: Initiation (2001-2005) 
The first stage of Cape Wind's development spanned from the conception 
of the project in 2001 to · the 2005 amendment to the Energy Policy Act, in which 
the federal government recognized offshore wind energy development. This 
stage was characterized by regulatory uncertainty, emerging 'contestation in 
public dialogue, and mobilization of relevant interest groups. In this stage, the 
regulatory condition was characterized with an established structure without 
industry-specific content. The regulatory procedure for permitting large-scale 
projects was well established but nothing was specific to offshore wind energy. 
This created a content-level void whereby contestation emerged without a clear 
path for mitigation and resolution. The project not only attracted the attention of 
extant stakeholder groups that were potentially to be affected by the project but 
also spurred the founding of new advocacy groups that sought to influence the 
permitting process. This stage saw a sharp rise of public engagement as well as 
polarization of stakeholders' positions on the project. 
Developer-Regulator Interaction 
A New England-based entrepreneur Jim Gordon started the idea of Cape 
Wind. Jim Gordon had a business background in energy conservation. Prior to a 
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formal announcement, the idea about a proposal for an offshore wind farm 
started to circulate in the Cape Cod communities of Massachusetts since the 
Summer of 2001. At that time, the developer was not aware of any regulation 
specific to offshore wind energy development and had difficulty identifying the 
lead permitting authority. The developer's inquiry with the Department of the 
Interior, which oversaw offshore oil and mineral resources, but was denied. The 
closest legal footing that the developer found was a Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriation Act of 1899. This Act authorized the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE) to lead federal permitting processes on major construction 
projects in navigable waters. With that authority, the USACE would lead the 
environmental impact assessment as required by the National Environmental 
Protection Act (NEP A) (Title 33 of CFR). 
The siting of the Cape Wind project was based on technical and economic 
considerations. The developer considered wind resources (i.e. pattern of wind 
productive for power generation), volume and location of demand, and 
constructability (i.e. engineering and economic requirements for construction). 
No formal community consultation was known to have taken place during this 
siting phase. After minor adjustments, the developer chose a site in the body of 
waters located in Horseshoe Shoal, Nantucket Sound, Massachusetts. Though the 
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site was between the Massachusetts mainland, Martha's Vineyard, and 
Nantucket Island, the location itself was solely in federal waters. The federal 
regulator was then to take the lead in the permitting process, even though it still 
required multiple, often more specialist permits from state and local authorities. 
The list of Cape Wind's required permits and reviews is found in Table 4.1. The 
project was subject to regulatory review by 20 agencies1 across federal, state, and 
local levels. 
On November 22, 2001, the developer, Cape Wind Associates. LLC, filed a 
formal application with the USACE, marking the first application for a first 
offshore wind farm in the United States. Despite the absence of any industry-
specific regulation, the USACE received the application under the extant 
frameworks on permitting construction projects. 
From the 2001 application to the 2005 amendment to the EPA, the USACE 
and the developer proceeded with an established regulatory procedure. The 
USACE conducted public scoping hearings; the developer invested in scientific 
studies and filed information to support the USACE's review. The USACE issued 
a draft Environmental Impact Statement and conducted further hearings the 
1 Table 4.1 included the Department of Interior, which obtained the lead permitting 
authority after the 2005 amendment to EPA. 
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public to comment on the draft. This process was disrupted by the 2005 legal 
change and the subsequent jurisdictional transfer. I will discuss the hearings in 
detail in the next subsection. 
·~ 
public to comment on the draft. This process was disrupted by the 2005 legal 
change and the subsequent jurisdictional transfer. I will discuss the hearings in 
detail in the next subsection. 
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One key issue at this stage in the regulatory process was that there was 
not much information specific to the technology and to the chosen location. No 
wind farm was ever operational in the United States, not to mention Nantucket 
Sound. The developer invested in original studies and sought to fill that 
informational void. The developer contracted much of this environmental work 
to ESS Group, a consulting firm based in Massachusetts. By June 2005, the 
developer had spent approximately $22 million, mostly on these scientific studies. 
This was reflected in the USACE' s draft EIS: of the 75 site-specific original 
studies cited by the regulator, 77.3% were filed or authored by the developer or 
its hired contractors. In fact, this this percentage only increased for the rest the 
permitting process (Table 4.2). In other words, from the onset, the developer bore 
the majority of the financial cost in generating new information, a fact often 
under opponents' attack in later stages of the permitting process as a way to 
question the neutrality of the impact studies. 
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Table 4.2 Sponsorship/ Authorship of Original Studies 
Distribution of Filer/Author Type in Original Studies 
Filer/Author Type USACEDEIS :MJviS DEIS :MJviS FEIS 
(of original studies) 2004 2008 2009 
Firm or its contractors 58 103 107 
Govt or its contractors 9 12 11 
Third parties 8 11 11 
Filer/Author Type in% 
(of original studies) 
Firm or its contractors 77.3% 81.7% 82.9% 
Govt agencies 12.0% 9.5% 8.5% 
Third parties 10.7% 8.7% 8.5% 
Distribution of Sponsorship of Original Studies 
• Third parties 
• Govt 
100. 0"/o ,---------,.....-
90.0% +----
80.0% +---
70.0% +--- -
60.0% +-----
.50.0% +-- -
40.0% +----
30.0% +---
20.0% +---
10.0% +----
0.0"/o +-- -
USACEDEIS 
2004 
10.7% 
12.0% 
• Firm or its contractors 773% 
MMSDEIS 
2008 
8.7% 
9.5% 
81.7% 
MMSFEIS 
2009 
8.5% 
8.5% 
82.9% 
Total 
(Unique) 
122 
13 
17 
80.3% 
8.6% 
11.2% 
• Third parties 
• Govt agendes 
• Firm or its contractors 
Figure 4.2 Distribution of Sponsorship of Original Studies 
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Contestation within regulatory channels 
Outside the direct developer-regulator interaction, the project's permitting 
process became a hotbed for ballooning of contestation. A diverse array of 
individual and organizational stakeholders showed strong concerns about the 
project. The concerns started out of apprehension as to how the project would 
affect the natural environment as well as stakeholders' interests and way of life. 
One important way the stakeholders engaged the regulatory process was 
through participation in public hearings. Hearings are an established and 
regulated procedure through which concerned members of the public would 
have the opportunity to make their comment, on record, in front of the regulators. 
In this first stage of Cape Wind's development (2001-2005), two sets of public 
hearings were held under the USACE's jurisdiction. The first set was held in 2002 
· as scoping hearings to solicit the public' input on the scope of the impact studies. 
The second set was held in 2004, shortly after the publication of the draft EIS, for 
the public to comment on the draft. 
As can be seen in Table 4.3, the number of participants increased 
dramatically from 2002 to 2004, by approximately 207%, suggesting a sharp rise 
in the interest and engagement from the general public. Among those 
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participants, about half were private citizens and half were organizational actors. 
This split had remained fairly stable across the years. 
Table 4.3 Summary Statistics of Hearing Participation 
2002 2004 2008 
Number of Unique Participants 99 306 304 
Organizational affiliations: 
Participants without Organizational 50.51% 53.92% 56.91% Affiliation 
Participants with Organizational 
49.49% 46.08% 43.09% Affiliation 
% of those speaking in official capacity 91.84% 78.01% 89.31% 
Participants' Position on the Project: 
For 25.25% 46.73% 40.13% 
Against 40.40% 42.48% 53.95% 
Neutral 34.34% 10.78% 5.92% 
The positions that hearing participants took, however, polarized 
significantly. As seen in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.3, in the initial 2002 scoping 
meeting, though 40.4% opposed the project, a significant percentage of 
participants were neutral (34.34%) and kept an open mind. In 2004, the 
percentage of those who opposed the project remain largely unchanged ( 42.48% ), 
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but those that favored the project grew to 46.73%, leaving only 10.78% being 
neutral. In other words, in the two years between the scoping meeting and the 
publication of the DEIS, participants took their positions, with an approximately 
even overall split between the two positions. This polarization of positions 
suggested that the project became contentious with the potentially of splitting 
the communities of stakeholders. 
Hearing Participants' Position on the Project (2002-2008) 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
2002 2004 2008 
- For - Against - Neutral 
Figure 4.3 Hearing Participant's Positions on Cape Wind 
A diverse range of organizational interests were represented in the 
h~arings (Table 4.x). This breadth of the organizational types suggested the scope 
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of interests that the project had invoked. No single type of organizations was 
able to dominate the hearings. However, government agencies, especially local 
government agencies, were consistently the most represented in hearings. At 
some point, for example, in 2004, local government agencies accounted for 
almost a quarter of all the organizational representations. This signals local 
government's considerable efforts to influence a federal regulatory process via 
engaging the hearing mechanism. This was consistent with the overall 
jurisdictional uncertainty surrounding the project: the lead permitting authority 
rested with the federal level whereas the extent of influence by local, township-
level jurisdiction was rather limited, even though the impacts of the project were 
mostly local. 
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Table 4.4 Types of Organizations and their Participation in Hearings 
2002 2004 2008 
Type of Organizations #of % in #of %in #of %in 
Reps 2002 Reps 2004 Reps 2008 
Advocacy 3 8.57% 13 13.98% 11 11.58% 
Aviation authorities 3 3.16% 
Boating organizations 1 2.86% 2 2.15% 7 7.37% 
Civic associations 1 2.86% 11 11.83% 6 6.32% 
Conservation groups 3 8.57% 10 10.75% 12 12.63% 
Federal government* 1 1.08% 1 1.05% 
Fisheries associations 3 8.57% 5 5.38% 5 5.26% 
Industry associations 2 5.71% 1 1.08% 3 3.16% 
Labor organizations 3 3.23% 4 4.21% 
Local government* 5 14.29% 23 24.73% 23 24.21% 
Military organizations 1 1.08% 
Native American 
4 4.21% 
associations 
Private firms 4 11.43% 6 6.45% 3 3.16% 
Professional associations 4 11.43% 
Religious organizations 1 1.08% 1 1.05% 
Research organizations 2. 2.15% 
Schools 1 1.08% 
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State government* 2 5.71% 4 4.30% 4 4.21% 
Trade organizations 3 8.57% 4 4.30% 6 6.32% 
Universities 2 5.71% 5 5.38% 1 1.05% 
Utilities 2 5.71% 1 1.05% 
*Government (all levels 
7 20.00% 28 30.11% 28 29.47% 
combined) 
In these hearings, not only a wide range of issues emerged, the 
participants also took diverse opinions on these individual issues. In the 2002 
hearings, the participants raised 65 issues across 396 instances of expression. The 
issues were as diverse as ranging from the impact on ocean view to avian life 
(birds), from global warming to local job creation/loss. Of the instances of 
expression, nearly half ( 43.69%) cited at least one issue to oppose the project, 
more than a third (37.12%) sought additional information, and only less than 20% 
supported it. In the 2004 post- draft EIS hearings, 71 issues were raised amidst 
intensified discussions (1002 instances of expression; - 153% increase) . Consistent 
with the polarization at the project level, issue-level positions also polarized: 
among the instances of expressions, 46.51% cited at least one issue to support the 
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project; 45.11% did so to oppose it; only 8.48% expressed a neutral position when 
citing an issue. 
In summary, a diverse range of individual and organizational 
stakeholders engaged the regulatory process, as demonstrated in hearing 
participations. They represented a diverse range of interests and concerns, with 
polarizing positions on the project. The Cape Wind project became a source of 
contestation that split communities, with no obvious path for mitigation, redress, 
or resolution. The evaluation of issue identification, evaluation, and resolution 
will be discussed in more detail in the next subsection. 
Contestation outside regulatory channels 
Contestation around Cape Wind did not stop within the established 
regulatory channels. The stakeholders also resorted to actions that were outside 
formal regulatory processes. They took up social movement activities, in 
mobilizing resources, founding advocacy groups, and reaching out to 
communities. The split of opinions did not stop at public hearings; the split 
found it way in communities, over media, and on the streets. 
The Cape Wind project stimulated the founding and mobilization of new 
advocacy groups. Two leading advocacy groups emerged, with opposite 
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positions on the project. The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound (APNS) was 
founded in 2001 and was opposed to the project. Clean Power Now was founded 
in 2003, as a response to the APNS, and promoted the project. Though of 
opposite ends, these two organizations served similar functions in kind and 
undertook similar actions in choice of tactics. They served the function of an 
umbrella organization that coordinated many otherwise diverse interest groups 
under a unified banner to either block or promote the project. These advocacy 
groups held fundraising events, reached out to communities, gave presentations, 
and held interviews with the media. The APNS viewed Cape Wind as a threat to 
"industrialize" Nantucket Sound and sought to "save our sound". Clean Power 
Now saw Cape Wind as part of an inevitable transition from fossil fuel to 
renewable energy and an opportunity for Cape Cod to be a leader in that 
transition. In summary, in this stage of the project development (2001-2005), two 
competing coalitions, coordinated by two advocacy groups, were emerging. 
In summary, contestation went beyond the boundary of the regulatory 
channels. New local advocacy groups were founded and mobilized, with 
competing positions on the project. Advocates resorted to social movement 
activities to promulgate their influence on the community. Interests groups were 
taking sides and forming coalitions. In the meantime, the mass media started to 
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pay attention to the contestation. A commercial energy project had become a 
topic of contestation, which started to take its own life. 
Progression of the Project and the Industry at Large 
In this first stage of development, Cape Wind's progress was primarily on 
the regulatory process. Even without any . industry-specific regulation, the 
regulatory process proceeded under the extant frameworks and reached the 
milestone of completing a draft Environmental Impact Statement. The project 
also made significant permitting progress at the state level. For example, in 2004, 
Massachusetts Energy Facility Siting Board (MA EFSB) gave a positive 
recommendation to the project in a 189-page review. In 2005, MA EFSB approved 
two 18-mile undersea transmission cables. In essence, despite the strong cynicism 
and resistance in and outside the regulatory channels, Cape Wind made tangible 
progress toward securing the required permits. 
Nonetheless, no major progress was made on the commercial front, such 
as securing buyer commitment in the form of a power purchase agreement (PP A), 
obtaining investment for construction, or securing supply · of the required 
equipment and services. 
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On the industry level, no other offshore wind energy project was known 
to have been formally proposed in the U.S. during this stage. Cape Wind was the 
only project that had initiated the permitting process. 
4.1.2. Stage II: Contestation (2005-2010) 
The second stage of Cape Wind's development spanned from the 2005 
legal recognition of offshore wind energy to the 2010 federal approval of the 
project. This stage was characterized with the parallel development of industry-
specific rule making and the project-specific permitting evaluation. With active 
rule-making in progress, the regulatory conditions were fluid: how Cape Wind 
was evaluated set a precedent that bore industry-level implications. The relevant 
stakeholders remained polarized in their positions and intensified their 
engagement with the regulatory process. The new advocacy groups had 
developed into functional social movement organizations. The Department of the 
Interior, the new lead permitting authority, approved the project amidst ongoing 
local controversy and shifting national political environment. 
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Developer-Regulator Interaction 
In this stage, the developer engaged with the Department of the Interior, 
new permitting lead, cooperated with the regulatory process, and achieved 
success by obtaining the federal permit. 
The legal change of 2005 bear both positive and negative impacts on Cape 
Wind. On the positive side, the legal recognition of offshore wind energy helped 
resolve certain fundamental issues that otherwise could not have been resolved. 
One such issue is the grant of right of way and its associated collection of lease. 
This addressed the debate whether public resources (e.g. ocean waters) could be 
used for private enterprise. Without proper legal categorization, there was no 
basis for calculating, collecting, and distributing lease on the right of way and 
easement. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.2. The 2005 
legal change also clarified who should be the lead permitting authority. This 
clarification eased the ongoing concern among local government and general 
public whether the USACE was the legitimate regulator. On the negative side as 
result of the legal change, the jurisdiction handover not only disrupted the 
regulatory process that had in progress since 2002, but also meant parts of the 
process might need to be repeated. Following the handover, the Department of 
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the Interior reviewed Cape Wind's application and determined a new draft 
Environmental Impact Statement would be necessary. The previous USACE 
DEIS and hearing transcripts would be taken in as scoping documents. In other 
words, approximately three years of work under the USACE' s jurisdiction would 
have to be repeated. This repetition increased the project's risks in permitting 
schedule, financial cost, and market predictability. Yet both the developer and 
the regulator decided to proceed. 
The developer continued to invest in scientific studies and bore the vast 
majority of the costs for generating information. As seen in Table 4.x, the number 
of site-specific original studied significantly increased from the time under the 
USACE' s jurisdiction. The number of original studies cited in the EIS increased 
from 58 in 2004 to 103 in 2008 and 107 in 2009: an -100% increase since the 
jurisdictional handover. The developer sponsored the majority of these studies. 
The percentage of the studies sponsored by the developer increased from 77.3% 
to 81.7% in 2008 and 82.9% in 2009. The rest of the studies were sponsored by 
other government agencies or third party, interested organizations (e.g. 
Massachusetts Audubon Society). By the time the final DEIS was published in 
January 2009, the developer had spent approximately $40 million, a significant 
portion of which was on conducting scientific studies .. 
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The developer's main share of the cost of information had several 
implications. First, because of the novelty of the project, little technology- or site-
specific information was available. No other organizations had sufficient 
obligations or incentives to conduct most of these studies on behalf of the project. 
The cost for filling the informational void then rested with the developer itself. 
For a relatively small developer such as Cape Wind, this burden and the 
associated risks were significant. Second, environmental studies often required 
multi-year studies to build a sufficient understanding of seasonality and animal 
migration. This was particularly apparent in an offshore environment, where 
seasonality and migratory patterns were applicable to many species in birds, fish, 
· and marine mammals. For this reason, producing high-quality, multi-year data 
in order to fulfill regulatory requirements and satisfy public concerns 
considerably lengthened the lead time of the regulatory process. Third, because 
the developer sponsored most of the studies, the neutrality of the results became 
a source of contention. Opponents cited the developer's sponsorship as an angle, 
when speaking in and outside formal hearings, to discredit the objectivity of the 
impact studies. 
The MMS, under the Department of the Interior (DOl), took the lead as the 
main federal permitting authority. It compiled and published the new draft EIS 
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in 2008, held public comment hearings, and published the final EIS in January 
2009. In tandem, the Department of the Interior was drafting the operational 
rules on regulating alternative energy development on the outer continental shelf. 
Some Cape Wind-specific organizations, such as the APNS, also actively 
commented on the industry-wide rule making. Shortly after publishing Cape 
Wind's final EIS, the Department of the Interior published the final rules (i.e. 
Title 30 of CFR, Sec 250, 285, 290) that operationalized the 2005 legal 
amendments. This close window of time suggested the DOl considered Cape 
Wind and the industry-wide rules in parallel. 
The DOl-led regulatory process came close to the end amidst strong 
opposition and severe contestation. In the 2008 hearings, 53.95% of the 
participants opposed the project. The draft EIS received -21,000 written 
comments, a scale of public response rarely seen in recent DOl history. In front of 
mounting controversy, the DOl withheld a final decision for over a year 
following the final EIS. 
However, several key events after the final EIS shifted the macro-political 
environment and precipitated a final approval. ·First, in October 2009, Senator 
Edward Kennedy passed away. With a home compound in Hyannis facing 
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directly at the wind farm's proposed location, Senator Kennedy attached 
personal emotions to Nantucket Sound and had been a strong opponent against 
Cape Wind. Kennedy's death meant a major political blockage was cleared, 
allowing the regulator more latitude to lean toward a favorable decision on Cape 
Wind. 
Second, the developer made progress on the commercial front. In 
December 2009, Cape Wind made headways in securing a power purchase 
agreement (PPA) with National Grid worth 50% of Cape Wind's power output, 
pending a positive regulatory outcome. In March 2010, the developer announced 
plans to source turbines from Siemens, which was to open an office on offshore 
wind in Boston. These areas of progress created clarity to the commercial 
prospect of the project and strengthened the business case in pressuring the 
regulator. 
Third, on April 20, 2010, the BP oil spill began in the Gulf of Mexico. The 
DOl was the authority that originally approved the failed oil rig. This oil spill of 
a monumental scale quickly dominated the U.S. public dialogue. Three days later, 
the governors of six Atlantic states (MA, RI, NY, NJ, DE, and MD) sent a letter to 
DO I' s Secretary Salazar in support of Cape Wind. On the same day, four 
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environmental groups sent a letter to President Obama in support of Cape Wind. 
Nine days since the BP spill, on April29, Secretary Salazar approved Cape Wind. 
The BP spill was crisis event that elevated the dialogue on oil and clean energy to 
the top of the national agenda. The fact that the DOl was the original rig 
approver placed it under close public scrutiny. The letters from six governors 
and four environmental groups in the immediate context of the BP spill left the 
DOl little space for justifying further delay to a decision on Cape Wind. 
Contestation within regulatory channels 
In this second stage (2005-2010) of Cape Wind's development was 
highlighted with the publication of DO I' s EIS, one set of public hearings to 
comment on the draft EIS, and the final federal approval. In this stage, the 
stakeholders continued to engage the regulatory process, participated in hearings, 
and submitted written comments. The stakeholders' positions remained highly 
polarized, with no signs of resolution or reconciliation. 
As seen in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.3, about the same number of participants 
took part in hearings in 2008 and 2004 (306 in 2004 and 304 in 2008). The makeup 
of individual versus organizational participants was about the same as well, with 
a slight tendency toward more participants without organizational affiliations. 
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What was of note was that the percentage of participants that opposed the 
project actually increased than previous hearings (40.4% in 2002, 42.48% in 2004, 
and 53.95% in 2008). About 40% favored the project in 2008 and only about 6% 
still remained undecided. Similarly to 2004, only less than half of the participants 
actually mentioned the EIS in 2008 while the hearings were meant for soliciting 
comments on the EIS. 
These statistics suggested that the stakeholders continued to engage the 
regulatory apparatus to express their support or opposition. The relevant 
stakeholders had taken sides and remained steadfast in the split of opinion. It 
also means that, despite the 2005 legal change and despite the new scientific 
information since 2004, stakeholders had not changed their split of positions on 
the project. The stakeholder's positions appeared to be decoupled from the 
progress made in gathering site-specific information. This puzzle is be to further 
explored in Section 4.2 when I discuss the structural disconnect between the 
scope of interests between the regulator and the public. 
Contestation outside regulatory channels 
In this second stage of Cape Wmd's development, two competing 
coalitions had emerged. The two competing advocacy groups grew and matured 
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into functional social movement organizations. Specialist interest groups, such as 
fishermen's partnerships and local aviation organizations, had solidified their 
position. The Cape Cod communities remained split, despite the progress made 
within the regulatory process. 
In this stage, the two competing advocacy groups, the Alliance to Protect 
Nantucket Sound and Clean Now Power, solidified their position as umbrella 
organizations that represented the diverse constituents, organized under the 
common goal of either blocking or promoting the project. Both groups saw rapid 
growth in memberships, funding, scale of activities, and frequency of media 
engagement. Organized activities with opposing objectives permeated the Cape 
Cod communities in diverse forms such as mail-in circulars, community 
meetings, fund-raising events, volunteering events, school presentations, bumper 
stickers, pamphlet distribution, artwork creation and display, lobbying activities, 
organized parades and protests, and online social networking. These two 
organizations evolved, from small, emerging groups with limited scopes, into 
fully functional social movement organizations that possessed considerable skills 
and capacities in framing arguments, mobilizing resources, and shaping public 
opinion. 
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Progression of the Project and the Industry at Large 
In this second stage (2005-2010), the project achieved regulatory success 
by obtaining the lead federal approval from the Department of the Interior. This 
marked the first federal approval the U.S. government granted to an offshore 
wind farm in the United States. Undoubtedly, the project moved forward on the 
regulatory front. 
The project also made progress on the commercial front. It secured a PP A 
worth 50% of its output with National Grid. It also made plans to source turbine 
equipment from Siemens. 
Nonetheless, it had been nine years since the project was first proposed. 
Several risks started to emerge. First, the gear-driven, monopole wind turbine 
started to become obsolete. More efficient or deeper-water models started to 
mature and become commercially viable. The permit the developer obtained, 
however, was attached to the specific technical model in the original application. 
It may lock the project into an increasingly obsolescent technology. Second, the 
developer had spent more than $40 million during the regulatory process, largely 
out of the founder's personal finances. The developer ran the risk of depleting its 
financial resources. Third, since the 2001 project proposal, the market conditions 
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had considerably changed. Rising costs of equipment and falling price of gas 
started to challenge the project's business feasibility. These factors became 
significant sources of barrier in the third stage (2010-2014). 
Apart from Cape Wind, the industry as a whole had seen a few key 
developments in this stage but progress had been slow. In 2007, a developer 
named Bluewater Wind signed America's first power purchase agreement (PPA) 
for an offshore wind project off the coast of Delaware. But the PP A was put on 
hold as the state's Public Service Commission found the project not in public 
interest due to its high cost. Another developer, Deepwater Wind, secured and 
sustained a PP A for its proposed offshore wind farm in Block Island, RI. 
However, despite the PP A success, Deepwater Wind was yet to obtain the 
regulatory permits as of 2010. In summary, the offshore wind energy industry as 
a whole had seen certain developments with limited progress. This potential 
industry was still in a developmental stage characterized with uncertainty over 
commercial pricing, regulatory permitting, and operating models. 
62 
4.1.3 Stage III: Stalemate (2010-2014) 
This third stage of Cape Wind's development spanned from the MMS' 
federal approval of the project in 2010 to mid-2014. This period was 
characterized with the completion of the permitting process, commercial 
development of the project, and ongoing, unresolved contestation Though the 
developer had secured all the necessary regulatory permits, they were repeatedly 
challenged in courts of law. Many of the socioeconomic issues remained 
unresolved. In the contexts of legal battles and ongoing resistance, the progress 
in securing key business relations had been slow and difficult. With shifting 
technological and economic conditions, the eventual outcome of the project 
remained uncertain. 
Developer-Regulator Interaction 
In this stage, industry-specific regulations were in existence. The laws, 
operational rules, and the first precedent (Cape Wind) of approval were all in 
place. The regulatory uncertainty that overshadowed the project's early stage of 
development had been clarified. After DOl's 2010 federal approval, the 
developer secured several other specialist permits and, in January 2011, became 
the first fully permitted offshore wind energy project in the United States. 
63 
Developer's Commercial Development 
The developer's focus shifted to the commercial front and sought to 
develop key business relations with investors, buyers, and suppliers. The 
progress had been slow and difficult due to a combination of economic and 
social factors. 
First, in buyer relations, the developer struggled securing the sales of all of 
its power output. Since the DOl approval, the developer signed a 15-year PP A 
with NStar for 27.5% of the project's power output. Together with the 50% 
commitment in the 2010 PP A with National Grid, Cape Wind secured buyers for 
77.5% of its output. However, it had been unable to secure a PP A for the 
remaining 22.5%. The rates Cape Wind offered were considered too high. It was 
estimated that, even with eligible tax credits and government loan guarantee, 
Cape Wind's rates were not competitive compared with the prevailing rates on 
the market. The lack of full purchase commitment for its output made it difficult 
to develop relations with investors and suppliers. 
Second, in terms of investor relations, the developer made difficult 
progress in securing funding. It is of note that all non-government funding that 
the developer secured was from overseas investors, suggesting strong lack of 
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confidence among domestic commercial investors. These overseas investments 
were mostly not firm but conditional commitment, pending a specific 
construction schedule, adding another layer of risk in these investments. 
The project cost estimate had significantly increased smce its 2001 
proposal. By early 2014, the estimate had increased to $2.6 billion. The developer 
only started to secure funding since the 2010 DOl approval. Since then it had 
secured -$1.4 billion, with 1.2 billion outstanding. Among the $1.4 billion, $500 
million (35.71 %) came from loan guarantees from the US Department of Energy 
(DOE); $200 million (14.29%) from PensionDanmark, a Danish NGO pension 
investment organization; $600 million (42.86%) from EKF, a Danish state-owned, 
commercially operated credit agency; and $100 million .(7.14%) from Siemens, the 
developer's chose supplier of turbine equipment. In total, the Developer had 
conditionally secured about half (53.85%) of the required funding and two thirds 
(64.29%) of the promises came from European investors. 
Three factors could plausibly explain the barrier to securing investment 
funding. First, the technology has been fast changing and alternative turbine 
designs were maturing, making investment in an increasingly obsolete design 
less attractive. Second, the energy supply in the US had stabilized in the recent 
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decade with an abundance of domestic natural gas and crude oil. This had 
constrained the ceiling price the Developer could charge the buyers. Even with 
the premium in exchange for price predictability in contrast with fossil fuel's 
fluctuation, a low rates ceiling prevailing in the energy market made Cape Wind 
less competitive. Third, Cape Wind remained as socially and politically 
controversial. It regularly attracted media attention. Such ongoing public display 
of contestation could be considered as a risk that investors tended to avoid. 
Third, in terms of supplier relations, the developer made significant 
progress in securing equipment and services. However, the choice of vendors 
faced criticism as it was viewed as departing from the original promise of 
creating American jobs. The original chosen vendor for wind turbines was GE 
Energy. In 2009, while the regulator had yet to issue permitting decision on the 
project, GE left the deal out of concerns over rising costs of offshore wind 
turbines. After the DOl approval, the developer secured turbine supply with 
Siemens. But Siemens would manufacture turbines in Denmark as, without a 
stable demand lineup, Siemens would not justify building manufacturing 
facilities in the United States. "It's very difficult to build a new factory on the 
back of one order", said Mark Rogers, the developer's spokesperson, as quoted 
in New York Times on January 22, 2014. In a similar vein, Mass Tank, a 
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Massachusetts-based tank manufacturer, lost a bid to a Germany vendor, as 
Mass Tank needed funds to build a plant, making the bid more expensive. The 
theme was that, since offshore wind energy industry did yet not exist in the 
United States, the front-end investment for capability buildup could hardly be 
justified. Without predictable growth in demand, the investment in supply 
capacity did not make economic sense. The immediate remedy, as in Cape 
Wind's situation, was to outsource to a foreign vendor. Yet this departed from 
the promise the developer and its proponents made about creating American 
jobs. This departure soon became a point of attack from the proponents. The 
Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound stated on its website, "Cape Wind has 
established a disturbing pattern of outsourcing jobs to foreign countries, despite 
claims to create local jobs", a theme of criticism commonly seen in mass media. 
Social Contestation 
In this stage, social contestation persisted even though the project gained 
all the necessary regulatory permits. The opponents repeatedly challenged the 
legality of the permits in the courts of law. Advocacy activities diminished 
considerably with organizational shake-ups in both of the competing coalitions. 
The developer sought direct negotiation with opponents with mixed results. 
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The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound (APNS), the lead opposition 
advocacy group, coordinated a series of lawsuits in federal and state courts of 
law to challenge the legalitY of the regulatory permits and of power purchase 
agreements. The plaintiffs included advocacy groups (e.g. the Alliance, Three 
Bays Preservations), local government (e.g. Town of Barnstable), and tribal 
nations (e.g. Aquinnah Tribe). The defendants included the developer, federal 
regulators (e.g. the Dept. of the Interior, USACE, FAA, US Coast Guard), state 
utilities regulators (e.g. Massachusetts Dept. of Public Utilities, Massachusetts 
Dept. of Energy), and utilities operators (e.g. NStar, a signed buyer of Cape 
Wind's output). As of the mid-2014, all legal challenges had been lost or 
dismissed. However, more lawsuits were in the pipeline. Though the developer 
managed to preserve its success in regulatory approvals and signed PP As, 
repeated legal challenges elevated uncertainty, posed difficulty in developing 
commercial relations, and further delayed project schedule. 
Since the 2010 DOl approval, the overall level of activities of advocacy 
groups had diminished considerably, with organizational shake-ups leading to 
divergent directions. Clean Power Now, the lead proponent advocacy group, 
celebrated Cape Wind's regulatory success, realized it had achieved its objective, 
and closed its doors at the end of 2011. The closedown of Clean Power Now 
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created a vacuum for an umbrella organization to coordinate activities in support 
of the project. This vacuum was apparent when the opponents shifted the focus 
to the legal front and remained coordinated. To fill this vacuum, in mid-2012 a 
number of conservation groups created a new advocacy group Cape Wind Now. 
It was organized by Conservation Law Foundation, a New England-based 
conservation organization, and included Cape Wind supporters such as Sierra 
Club, Greenpeace, and Cape and Islands Self-Reliance. However, Cape Wind 
Now's activities remained relatively low profile in comparison with peak actions 
of Clean Power Now before the DOl approval. 
By contrast, the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, the lead opponent 
advocacy group, and the other proponents did not diminish their efforts to block 
the project. Though focusing on the legal front, the opponents continued to 
actively mobilize resources and engage the media. The APNS maintained a 
similar level of fundraising level as in the peak time preceding the DOl decision. 
The developer sought reconciliation by direct negotiating with the 
opponent stakeholders. This strategy yielded limited success, but the vast 
majority of the opponents remained opposed. For example, the developer 
negotiated with Hy-Line Cruises, a ferry and cruise company operating in 
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Nantucket Sound. They reconciled on the concern over Cape Wind's potential 
impact on navigation and agreed to jointly operate an eco-tour of the wind farm 
once it was built. Nonetheless, other ferry organizations (e.g. the Steamship 
Authority, Cape & Islands Harbormasters Association) remained opposed to the 
project. The developer also sought reconciliation with commercial fishing 
interests. In June 2012, it signed a settlement agreement with Martha's Vineyard 
- Dukes County Fishermen's Association. However, on the same day of the 
settlement, Massachusetts Fishermen's Partnership, representing 18 other 
fishermen's associations in the area, reiterated their strong opposition to the 
project in a press release. 
In summary, social contestation persisted. The proponents' level of 
engagement had diminished since the regulatory approval. The opponents' 
continued with a high level of engagement and shifted efforts to the courts of law. 
The developer's strategy of direct negotiation produced little result. There was 
no obvious indication that the various issues under contestation could be 
effectively resolved. The project became the subject of a documentary film and a 
regular topic in mass media. 
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Progression of the Project and the Industry at Large 
In this third stage (2010-2014), the project development made considerable 
but difficult progress. With all the regulatory permits in hand, the developer's 
attention pivoted to developing business relations, preserving regulatory success, 
and easing contestation through negotiation. The developer conditionally 
secured half of the investment funds required for construction and operation, but 
struggled with selling all of its output and faced criticism in its vendor selection. 
The regulatory permits and PP As had survived legal challenges but repeated 
lawsuits slowed down business development. Limited progress was made in 
easing contestation and obtaining social license. In the context of rising costs, 
aging technology, and a stable energy market, the prospect of the · project ever 
being built became increasingly uncertain. 
In this stage, the industry of offshore wind energy as a whole had seen 
significant efforts in developing new projects but had achieved limited progress. 
In 2014, the Department of Energy released its first offshore wind energy market 
report, compiled by an external consulting firm. As of 2014, 14 ·projects were 
considered in their advanced stage of development. Only two projects had 
secured the PP A: Cape Wind and Deepwater Wind. Ten leases were granted and 
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$47 million DOE funding were award to three projects (Appendix A-2). However, 
no project had begun construction and no project was in operation as of mid-
2014. The potential industry of offshore wind energy has yet failed to emerge. 
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4.2 Comparative Study of Issues: Domains, Topology, and Evolution 
Part I of the Finding chapter provides a three-stage, longitudinal account 
of Cape Wind's history, narrated from the vantage points of developer-regulator 
interaction, social contestation, and the project's progress in each stage. 
Part II of this Findings chapter provides a cross-sectional comparison of 
issues. As elaborated in Chapter 3, Research Methods, an issue is defined as a 
distinct area of life with which a social actor is concerned and through which the 
actor participate in influencing a decision outcome. In the same vein with 
Laumann, Knoke, and Kim's (1985) definition, an issue space is an aggregate of 
interrelated issues substantively relevant within a domain of issues. 
In this section, the topology of issues is conceptualized in a framework of 
two organizing dimensions: problem-solving values (science vs. social justice) 
and problem-solving structure (stable vs. emergent). I will first define these 
organizing concepts. I will then show two distinct issue spaces that underpinned 
Cape Wind's permitting process: one of the public discourse and one of the 
regulatory regime. These two issue spaces were structurally disengaged, 
resulting in ongoing, unresolved issues in the public discourse despite 
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permitting success by the regulatory regime. The issues that required a scientific 
resolution using stable methods tended to be resolved to a greater extent than 
those requiring a social justice resolution with emergent methods. I then 
illustrate this structural disengagement in detail by discussing six exemplary 
issues that highlighted Cape Wind's permitting process. 
4.2.1 Definitions and the Organizing Framework 
In this subsection, I briefly define what issues are, what issue spaces 
include, and how an issue may be considered resolved. Then I introduce the two-
dimensional framework that I would use to organize the findings around issues. 
Issue, Issue Space, and Issue Resolution 
An issue is a domain of life with which a social actor is concerned and 
through which the actor actively exerts influence on a decision outcome. The 
domain of life concerned could be natural, technical, social, or personal. The 
concern with an issue makes a social actor a stakeholder in a public discourse. A 
stakeholder considers a certain issue relevant and is motivated to take action to 
shape the issue in a way consistent with his/her interests, values, or beliefs. For 
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example, how the Cape Wind project would affect fisheries is an issue, which 
bears both technical and economic elements. A commercial fishermen or a 
fishermen's association is such a stakeholder that considers this issue relevant 
and is motivated to take action (e.g. go to hearings, engage with media) in order 
to shape the issue and influence a decision outcome (e.g. to encourage a 
regulatory denial to preserve fishing interests). An issue does not have to bear 
direct immediate consequences to the stakeholder. It is a perceived concern with 
perceived relevance. For example, jurisdictional uncertainty or energy independence 
are such issues that many actors view as relevant, though they might not have 
immediate consequentiality on the actor. 
An issue space includes all the issues brought into consideration for a 
decision domain within a social, temporal boundary, defined in a similar vein 
with Laumann, Knoke, and Kim's (1985) analysis. The boundary of an issue 
space is empirical, substantive, and the researcher's conscious choice. It is a 
population of issues identified by a certain empirical yardstick. It delimits the 
aggregate scope of interests of the actors empirically relevant to a decision 
outcome. Its boundary implies inclusion/exclusion of actor's concerns within a 
finite timeframe. For example, in the Cape Wind project, all issues raised in all 
public hearings in front of federal regulators constituted an issue space. Similarly, 
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all issues formally assessed in all versions of the Environmental Impact 
Statements constitute another issue space. 
To what extent an issue is resolved depends on the angle of the 
stakeholder: an issue resolved for one party may not be resolved for another. In 
this study, I gauge the extent of resolution by the potential amount of influence 
an issue may entail on the progression of the project. The extent of issue 
resolution is then essentially a measure of consequentiality of a given issue in its 
potential in promoting, delaying, or blocking the project. This is distinct from the 
extent of engagement an individual may exercise on the issue. For example, in 
the issue of Cape Wind's impact on birds, after convergent evidence became 
available that supported a favorable assessment of the project, to the satisfaction 
of both the regulator and the third party expert (i.e. MA Audubon Society), this 
issue was considered resolved, in the sense that it no longer had significant 
potential in influencing the regulatory decision or the project's progress. The 
issue might still be contested in the public domain, with non-expert individuals 
voicing opposition. However, the directly involved stakeholders on the issue had 
concurred in such a way that this issue would no longer affect project's progress. 
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Problem-solving values: Science vs. Social justice 
In this section I map the issue spaces identified in Cape Wind's permitting 
process using an organizing framework of two dimensions: problem-solving values 
and problem-solving structure. The problem-solving values are fundamental 
guiding assumptions that underlie issue resolution. Science and social justice are 
two competing values that sit on an ordinal scale that gauges the extent to which 
problem-solving relies on a scientific, positivist rationality versus a consensus-
building, constructivist rationality. The scientific rationality is a belief system that 
posits an objective, natural reality independent of human understanding or 
intervention. It relies on scientific methods and empirical data for investigating, 
understanding, and resolving issues. The application of the scientific rationality 
champions rigor, precision, and accuracy. An example would be how a scientist 
investigates the behaviors of an avian species. The inquiry would be based on a 
principle that the bird behavior follows laws independent of human intervention. 
The investigation would rely on established methods (e.g. radar detection, 
rigorous sampling) and empirical data (e.g. primary data collected from field 
observations). 
The rationality of social justice, in contrast, believes in a world order that is 
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socially constructed. The tenet is that there is no independent knowledge outside 
what is built on social consensus. As a problem-solving value, it privileges 
fairness over technicality and relies on constructing mutual understanding and 
consensus for issue resolution. Its hallmarks are inclusivity, pluralism, 
democracy, and equity. An example would be the project's impact on Native 
American culture. The resolution of such an issue depends on a democratic 
process to engage the relevant parties (e.g. the developer, tribal nation 
representatives, advocacy groups), to build understap.ding between distinct 
cultural groups and to seek common ground for agreement. Instead of requiring 
scientific studies or data, this resolution would be a political process that 
champions inclusivity and fairness . 
Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that the extreme ends of the 
science-justice continuum are theoretic ideals. In social reality, issues most likely 
contain both scientific and justice elements and require joint efforts of scientific 
inquiry and political engagement. For example, the project's impact on fisheries . 
The physical aspects consider the benthic environment, fish species or fishing 
technologies. These considerations would require more of a scientific approach. 
·The socio-economic aspects would consider the project's impact on job loss, loss 
of come, or competing use of waterways. These socioeconomic considerations 
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would call for more of a social justice, political approach. 
I mapped the 75 issues coded from public hearings and 28 issues compiled 
from the Environmental Impact Statements on the Science-Justice scale. For each 
issue, I specified its position on this scale by assigning a numerical score for each 
problem-solving value. A score of -3, -2, -1 was assigned to an issue to gauge the 
extent a scientific approach was required for issue resolution, the larger the 
absolute value, the greater of the extent of this requirement. Similarly, a score of 
1, 2, 3 is ass-igned to an issue to gauge the extent a social justice approach was 
required for resolution, the larger the absolute value, the greater of the extent. 
The choice of the score for any given issue was determined through its position 
relative to other issues. Then the sum of these two scores yield this issue's 
position on the Science-Justice scale. 
Problem-solving structure: Stable -Emergent 
The second dimension used in the organizing framework is concerned 
with the problem-solving structure. This dimension is an ordinal scale that 
gauges, given an issue, how stable or emergent the available problem-solving 
structure is. A problem-solving structure is defined as a set of arrangements of 
institutions, standards, methods, and procedures that relevant actors deploy in 
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their decision making. These arrangements are historically formulated, usually 
as a response to novel circumstances in a particular socio-historical context. Over 
time, these arrangements may become widely accepted, practiced, and 
institutionalized. A problem-solving structure could be more or less stable or 
emergent, depending on the nature of the structure and its historical 
accumulation. For example, the US Supreme Court as an institution is a highly 
stable problem-solving structure. Its standards, methods, and procedures are 
highly specified with a long history of precedents. In contrast, the Department of 
the Interior's 2009 rules on developing offshore alternative energy is a much 
more emergent problem-solving structure. In addition to having no precedent in 
history, its standards, methods, and procedures are fluid, ambiguous, and still 
evolving. 
I mapped the 75 issues from public hearings and 28 issues from the 
Environmental Impact Statements on a scale of this structural stability. For any 
given issue, I examined the problem-solving structure available for resolving that 
issue and considered the factors of legal specificity, standards for evaluation, 
operational specificity, extent of precedents, regulator specificity, and 
information availability. Legal specificity is whether a law or policy exists with 
regards to this issue and if so, to what extent the relevant law is enforceable with 
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punitive consequences. For example, there is strong legal specificity in regulating 
civil aviation with severe consequence for non-compliance. Standards for 
evaluation examines whether there is established yardstick for measuring and 
assessing an issue. For example, scientific empirical methods for studying bird 
behavior is more established and standardized then studying a project's effects 
on local employment opportunities. Operational specificity is the extent by which a 
procedure is established, understood, and practiced in investigating a given issue. 
Extent of precedents is the number of historical precedents that are available for 
informing decision making. Regulator specificity is whether a given issue falls into 
the jurisdiction of a specific authority. Information available is the extent empirical, 
historical data is available on a given issue. It should be noted that these 
considerations are not mutually exclusive. In this study, they are jointly 
considered qualitatively when establishing an issue's relative position on the 
ordinal scale. Each issue is assigned a position on a scale of -3 to 3, with -3 
denoting the most stable and 3 denoting the most emergent. 
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4.2.2 Two Issue Spaces Compared 
I identified two distinct issue spaces associated with Cape Wind's 
permitting process. One represented the issue space of the public discourse. This 
was captured through coding the transcripts of the three sets of federal public 
hearings across three milestones (2002, 2004, 2008). Another issue space 
represented the issue space of the regulatory regime, consisting of issues 
officially evaluated by the lead regulator. This was captured through compiling 
issue assessments from the three versions of the Environmental Impact 
Statement (2004, 2008, 2009). 
I obtained the coordinates for any given issue by jointly considering its 
position on the two ordinal scales (problem-solving values and problem-solving 
structure). The 75 issues coded from hearings and the 28 issues compiled from 
Environmental Impact Statements each constitute an issue space graphically 
presented on a 2-by-2 map. Figure 4.4 is the issue space consisting the 75 issues 
from the three sets of federal public hearings (2002, 2004, 2008). Each number (in 
red) represents an issue. Figure 4.5 is the issue space consisting of the 28 issues 
compiled from the three versions of the Environmental Impact Statements (2004, 
2008, 2009). Each number (in blue) represents an issue. 
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Figure 4.5 Issue Space of the Regulatory Regime 
Three observations could be made in comparing these two issue spaces. 
First, the scope of interests of the public discourse was wider than that supported 
by the regulatory regime. The number of issue (75) identified in the public 
hearings was significantly larger than the number of issues (25) formally 
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assessed by the lead regulator. This signals a differential in scope between what 
the public deemed as relevant to the project's evaluation and what the regulatory 
regime found relevant and/or had the capacity to allow for engagement. 
Second, the scope of interests of the public discourse was more diversely 
distributed in kind while the scope of interests of the regulator was more focused. 
The issues deemed relevant by the public were found in considerable presence in 
all four quadrants of the framework (Figure 4.4). The regulator's scope of 
interests was, instead, concentrated in Northeast and Southwest quadrants with 
only one exception (Air Quality) found in the Northwest quadrant. In other 
words, while the public's interests traversed the full spectra of the two ordinal 
scales, the regulator's focus was mainly on issues that were scientific, requiring a 
stable problem-solving structure, or social justice issues requiring an emerging 
problem-solving structure. Absent were those social justice issues that would 
require a stable problem-solving structure (the Southeast quadrant). For example, 
the issues of Public Resources for Private Enterprise (Issue #60 in Figure 4.4), the 
Legality of the Project (Issue #47 in Figure 4.4), or the Need for Regulation (Issue #51 
in Figure 4.4) were social justice issues in nature and the mechanisms for 
resolving these issues were in fact fairly stable, with specific laws and precedents. 
Since such issues usually involved regulatory change or reinterpretation, the 
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regulatory review process per se might not have the capacity to support such 
actions. Also absent were those issues that were scientific in nature but the 
methods for investigation were still emerging without much clarity or consensus. 
For examples, the issues of the wind farms' Impact on Environment in General 
(Issue #29 in Figure 4.4), Technological Maturity (Issue #66 in Figure 4.4), or 
Conservation as Alterative (Issue #9 in Figure 4.4) were scientific issues in essence, 
but, due to the novelty of the technology and business models involved, there 
was not sufficient consensus on the methods for investigation, nor was there 
sufficient information available. Issues of this kind were commonly discussed in 
public discourse but rarely dealt with in the regulator's formal evaluation. 
The third observation was that, even within the Northeast and Southwest 
quadrants, the public and the regulator had different emphasis. The public 
tended to emphasize social justice issues requiring an emergent problem-solving 
structure. The regulator tended to emphasize scientific issues requiring a stable 
problem-solving structure. For example, the public scope of interests included 26 
issues in the high "social justice" and high "emergent structure" (the area with 
coordinates of >=2 on the justice scale and >=2 on the emergent scale). This 
accounted for 34.67% of all the issues the public deemed relevant. In the 
meantime, only 7 issues (9.33%) were found in the high "science" and high 
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"stable structure" area (=<-2 on the science scale and =<-2 on the stable scale). The 
regulator's emphasis was almost the opposite. 13 issues or 46.43% of the all the 
issues formally assessed by the regulator were found in the highly scientific, 
highly stable area. Only four issues or 14.29% were found the high justice, highly 
emergent area. This disconnect signals the disparity of attention that the public 
and the regulator attached to the same project. For the regulator, the project 
evaluation was primarily a scientific undertaking, using established standards 
and methods. For the public, the project primarily invoked debates on social 
justice, with only emerging, if any, standards and methods for investigation and 
mitigation. 
In summary, the public discourse and the regulatory regime were "talking 
past" each other. Not only the public's scope of interests was wider and more 
diverse than supported by the regulatory regime, the public and the regulator 
focused their respective attention on different kinds of issues. The regulator 
focused on issues that were more scientific in nature where relatively stable 
methods existed to investigate, evaluate, and resolve issues. The public, on the 
contrary, was mostly concerned with social justice issues that did not yet 
correspond to any established repertoire of standards and methods for resolution. 
One consequence of such an imbalance of interest was that those scientific issues 
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were mitigated or resolved within the regulatory regrme while many socio-
economic 1ssues remained contentious and persisted beyond the regulatory 
process. The Cape Wind project was exactly a case in point. 
4.2.3 Six Exemplary Issues in Detail 
In this subsection, I discuss six exemplary issues in more detail. These 
issues are Impact on Aviation, Impact on Avian Life (Birds), Climate Change, Public 
Resources for Private Enterprise, Impact on Fisheries, and Visual Impact. These issues 
were chosen as examples not only because they were among the most con 
throughout the permitting process, but each represented an example of a unique 
position in the framework of problem-solving values and structures. They will 
illustrate, in detail, how issues differed in their nature, required different 
methods for resolution, invoked different types of actor participation that 
yielded different outcomes. 
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Impact on Aviation 
The issue of the impact on aviation exemplified how an essentially 
scientific issue was resolved within the regulatory regime, with its permitting 
success sustained despite challenges from persistent opposition. Though it 
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contained social justice elements, this issue was highly scientific in nature and 
resided in a regulatory space of highly stable problem-solving structures. The 
highly specified regulatory authority, standards, and methods left little latitude 
for effective external intervention. 
How the project would affect aviation safety was among the most 
contested issues throughout the project's permitting process. This issue was 
formally raised in the very first scoping hearing in 2002. The concern was on 
how Cape Wind's 130 wind turbines, once built, would affect aviation safety in 
the area, with immediate causes such as radar interference, navigational 
difficulty, or hindrance to search and rescue. 
The regulations governing aviation safety were well established in the 
United States. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 empowered the Federal Aviation 
Administration or the FAA (previously Federal Aviation Agency), under the US 
Department of Transportation (DOT), to oversee all aviation activities. Therefore, 
there was no ambiguity as to the legal basis and regulatory authority in this area 
of the permitting process for Cape Wind. 
The regulator utilized its given authority and deployed scientific methods. 
It issued a determination in its official capacity and was able to sustain the 
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determination in subsequent legal challenges. The FAA conducted safety review 
of the project's impact on aviation. This review was independent of the NEP A 
environmental studies led by the USACE and the DOL The FAA had access to 
full information of the aviation activities in the area as well as the radar 
technologies deployed in the airport facilities. In January 2008, the FAA issued a 
determination of "presumed hazard" and indicated more studies were needed. 
In May 2010, the FAA issued a "No Hazard" determination. On the next day, 
three local airports (Nantucket, Martha's Vineyard, and Barnstable) requested 
the presumed hazard determination be made permanent. In August 2010, the 
FAA announced that it upheld and finalized its determination of no hazard. The 
opponents challenged this determination and the US Court of Appeals later 
revoked the FAA's "No Hazard" determination and requested the FAA to 
reconsider and explain the decision. The FAA issued another "No Hazard" 
determination in August 2012. It was challenged in court again but the US Court 
of Appeals upheld the FAA's decision. No further legal challenges were filed 
later. 
In the public discourse, the issue of impact on aviation was first raised in 
the 2002 scoping meetings. Some hearing participants raised it as a question 
mark and demanded that further studies be done to clarify the effects of turbines 
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on aviation. In the hearings, Barnstable Airport Commission had already started 
to "vehemently" oppose the project and predicted that the turbines would have 
"lethal effects" on the aviation community (See Table 4.6). In the 2004 and 
subsequent hearings, participants had taken their position; no neutral comment 
was identified. Proponents called the project "a major navigational hazard to air 
traffic" and safety issues would be "just a matter of time". Some emphasized the 
business of the local airports, with "400,000 flights a year". Some cited the UK 
experience with turbines' effect on radar and air safety. While most comments 
were against the project, two comments in 2008 were in favor. The founder and 
CEO of Cape Air and Nantucket Airlines agree with the FAA finding and grown 
"certain that nothing in the proposal would jeopardize our mission (of safety)". After 
the 2010 DOl approval and FAA's positive determination, social contestation 
over aviation had generally subsided. The APNS and the three local airport 
commissions were the main players challenging the FAA decision in court. Since 
the 2012 FAA repeat ruling, contestation over aviation had in effect phased out of 
the public discourse. 
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The issue of aviation illustrated that, when an issue was scientific in 
nature and a stable problem-solving structure existed, the issue was more likely 
to be resolved. The combination of these two conditions (scientific nature and 
stable structure) meant that the potential of influence was highly concentrated at 
the regulator's side. The regulator (i.e. the FAA) was not only the sole decision-
making authority, sanctioned by federal law, on evaluating such proposals in 
matters of civil aviation, but was also had access to the complete information of 
the relevant flight data, technological designs, and evaluative standards. Such 
information was beyond the general public's access and understanding. It raised 
a high barrier for external sources to have meaningful engagement with the 
regulator, since it required expensive resources and sophisticated studies. The 
FAA's authority and the procedural setup was highly stable with decades of 
precedents. The concentration of authority on a single regulator limited the 
opponents' potential courses of action to refute the FAA determination. There 
was no clear path of appealing to a third party for an effective adjudication. That 
explained why the subsequent lawsuits were mainly focused on FAA's 
procedural compliance rather than the substantive content itself. The comments 
in public hearings demonstrated the opponents' concern, opposition, and 
frustration, with limited effects on the regulator's decision-making. 
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Impact on Avian Life (Birds) 
The issue of the project's impact on avian life exemplified how a scientific 
issue was resolved through joint efforts of multiple parties in a less stable, 
relatively emergent problem-solving structure. The developer, the regulator, and 
independent organizations worked together, triangulated findings, and brought 
a novel scientific inquiry into a solution that was sahsfying to most stakeholders. 
It was an example how stakeholders innovated on existing methods to fill in the 
voids created by novelty. 
The issue of birds was a scientific issue: it was an inquiry into how, given 
the bird behavior in the area, the wind turbines would affect avian life. Though 
location-specific empirical data on avian species was scarce, the research 
methods for studying bird behavior were well established in the research 
community. The challenge was more on the lack of information. Because there 
was never an offshore wind farm in the U.S, there was never a reason to study 
certain bird behaviors that would only be relevant in the context of a wind farm, 
e.g. how high a certain species of bird would fly? Whether would the migration 
traverse the Horseshoe Shoal area? 
Moreover, the legal footing for assessing a project's impact on avian life 
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was primarily based on two acts: the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the 
Endangered Species Act. These acts required federal agencies to consider avian 
life when permitting project proposals. For Cape Wind, the USACE and later the 
DOl took the lead in conducting NEP A study and included birds within its scope 
under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. The lead regulator was also to consult the 
NOAA Fisheries Service and U.S. Fish and Wildlife to assess the impact on 
endangered species, if any, under the Endangered Species Act. In comparison 
with aviation, the legal specificity in the area of avian life was less defined. The 
decision-making authority was not as concentrated but shared across a few 
agencies. The punitive penalty for non-compliance in the case of birds was 
conceivably less consequential when compared with that in the aviation sector. 
In Cape Wind's permitting process, this issue of birds was resolved by 
joint efforts by three types of actors: the regulator, the developer, and an 
independent organization. The developer took the lead in conducting scientific 
studies while the MAS conducted its own studies to confirm and challenge the 
developer's findings. 
The developer took the lead in conducting studies and increased its efforts 
over the permitting process. Of the 28 original scientific articles cited in the three 
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versions of the EIS' s, the developer supplied 25 articles in total, growing from 12 
articles in 2004, to 24 in 2008, and 25 in 2009. The developer contracted the 
studies to the environmental consulting firm ESS Group, a marine research firm, 
Ceo-Marine, Inc, as well as individual experts. 
The MAS took a skeptical stance in the beginning and withheld its 
position on the project. Rather it conducted scientific studies using its own 
resources and cross-checked and challenged the developer's findings. The MAS 
conduced two main series of longitudinal studies. From August 2002 to Winter 
2005/06, it conducted aerial surveys of avian distribution and abundance in 
Nantucket Sound. Since Winter 2007/08, the MAS partnered with US Coast 
Guard and undertook longitudinal satellite telemetry research on long-tailed 
ducks. The results of these studies were published in the public domain and 
supplied to the regulator. Besides scientific studies, the MAS also visited wind 
farms in Denmark to draw upon the Danish experiences in wind farms' effects 
on avian species and post-construction monitoring practices. The visit further 
informed the MAS's positions on Cape Wind. 
The regulator compared and consolidated the separate findings from the 
developer and the MAS. The regulator then reached a conclusion that the project 
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would not have major impacts on avian life in the proposed location and 
published its assessment in the Environmental Impact Statement. See Table 4X 
for a list of events highlighting the interaction between the regulator, developer, 
and the MAS. 
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Table 4.7 Interactions of Regulator, Developer, and MAS on Avian Life 
Time Regulator Developer Mass Audubon (MAS) 
August 2001 
· Developer approached 
Mass Audubon. 
Surveys of avian distribution 
August2002 and abundance in Nantucket 
Developer conducted 
Sound began. 
studies and supplied MAS supplied USACE with 
findings o USACE. independent, primary 
2003-2004 research data on terns and 
winter waterfowl. 
November 2004 
USACE issued MAS began its review of 
draft EIS. USACE DEIS. 
MAS made public comments 
February 2005 and testified in hearings 
regarding the USACE DEIS. 
MAS visited Denmark re 
Spring 2005 offshore wind farms and bird 
migration. 
Aug-Oct Authority 
Developer announced 
2005 transfer to DOL 
its intention to comply 
with new regulations. 
Surveys of avian distribution 
Winter 2005/06 and abundance in Nantucket 
Sound were completed. 
DOl reviewed 
findings and 
Developer conducted MAS raised its "Challenge" 
March2006 compile 
studied supplied for data gaps and gave 
documentation. 
findings to DOL preliminary support. 
MAS issued conditional 
May 2006 support. 
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MAS commented on the 
March 2007 FElR for MEP A. 
Satellite telemetry research 
Winter 2007/08 on long-tailed ducks began, 
in partnership with USGS. 
January 2008 
DOl issued 
draft ElS. 
January 2009 
DOl issued 
final ElS. 
MAS and three other 
environmental groups sent a 
April2010 letter to President Obama in 
support of Cape Wind. 
April2010 
DOl approved 
Cape Wind. 
However, the issue of birds seen in the public discourse did not entirely 
correspond to the science-driven three-way development of the regulator, the 
developer, and the MAS. 
At the early stage of the permitting process, the public was mostly 
concerned with the lack of information and feared that the project would 
inevitably hurt the avian species. In the 2002 hearings, some participants 
predicted that birds "would be killed by the thousands" and could not see "how that 
could possibly be prevented". (See Table 4.8) The conservation success would be 
reversed and the endangered Piping Plover population would be "essentially 
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wiped out in a couple of years". 
Subsequently, the public was more divided on the issue, concerned with 
the risks but also recognizing the potential benefits to birds and to the 
environment at large. In 2004 hearings, opponents often challenged the EIS 
findings and called them "premature", "incomplete", and "flawed". Some cited 
negative examples of wind farms in California. Yet proponents saw the project's 
effects on birds in a positive light: "The number one threat to birds is global warming." 
"If the air is no good to breathe, the birds die, very simple." "Pollution from coal burning 
power plants .... oil spills in the waters of Cape Cod kill birds." 
At the late stage of the permitting process, however, the public became 
mostly negative on the issue of avian life, even though the scientific information 
on birds had become most complete and available. In the 2008 hearings, all bird-
related comments were negative; no positive or neutral comment was identified. 
Some participants directly commented "I don't agree with the DEIS's findings" and 
believed the turbines would "inevitably result in a higher mortality rate than stated" . 
Others were not convinced: "You talked about bird impacts ... ! am like 'Whoa"'. Yet 
others still sought parallel from California as a negative example and believed 
the community there misjudged the impact during the permitting process. 
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However, the silence of proponents in the 2008 hearing could also be 
interpreted as they were already convinced of the findings, considered the issue 
resolved, and thus were no longer motivated to engage the debate. In the 
meantime, the negative comments in 2008 did not cite any empirical data and 
were more of an expression of frustration than meaningful act of participation. 
Moreover, outside the regulatory process, there was no clear path for the 
remaining opponents to redress the regulator's assessment. There were no 
tangible economic interests attached with an identifiable formal organization that 
would take the lead and bear the cost. There was also no clear direction of appeal 
to other organizations or institutions; the legally relevant agencies, such as 
NOAA and U.S. Fish and Wildlife, had already been consulted by the regulator. 
The decision left the remaining opponents little latitude to exert further influence. 
In summary, the issue of the project's impact on birds exemplified how a 
scientific issue, while extant problem-solving structure is less stable and 
relatively emergent, could be resolved by relevant stakeholders' efforts to 
innovate and fill in the gaps. The developer and the third party organization 
(MAS) generated new information while relying upon established methods and · 
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standards. These efforts yielded defendable results that were recognized by the 
regulatory regime. 
It was also of note that the public discourse developed its own 
understanding of the issue in a way not entirely aligned with the progress within 
the regulatory regime. Toward the end of the permitting process, the view of 
public had departed from that in the formal regulatory assessment but did not 
have information sufficient to build an effective counterargument. Such negative 
concerns were likely to persist as a controversy but would have limited impact 
on the project's progress. 
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Impact on Climate Change 
Climate change is a scientific issue with social justice implication. It was a 
key argument Cape Wind and its proponents cited to legitimate the project and 
the offshore wind energy industry at large. Climate change was consistently 
cited positively in public hearings in support of the project. However, the 
regulatory regime currently did not have a structure to support calculating a 
project's benefits in detail. The structure was meant to assess risks and negative 
impacts. For Cape Wind, the Environmental Impact Statement only gave very 
limited coverage to discussing the project's impact on climate change. The 
benefits were evaluated conservatively without elaboration. The potential of the 
project's benefits on climate for contributing to a positive regulatory decision 
was not fully realized. 
The regulatory context around climate was highly fluid and ambiguous. 
As of the time when Cape Wind was reviewed, there was no specific laws or 
policies that required a formal study in this regard by the regulatory when 
perinitting a project. The standards were only emerging and fast evolving for 
calculating the effects of a particular power plant on the overall climate change 
and the associated health risks and economic costs. The only relatively acceptable 
115 
standard was the calculation of C02 emission when the power was generated by 
fossil fuel-fired means. In addition, the current regulatory structure and 
procedures were based on the assumption that projects' impacts on nature 
would the negative. This was because the current procedure was developed 
historically when projects were mainly fossil fuel facilities and regulator's 
concerns focused on risk identification. There was no structure to support the 
discussion of positive benefits or incorporate it into a formal cost-benefit analysis. 
The regulators provided very limited coverage on the projects' impact on 
climate change. The USACE grouped this issue with the discussion of the 
project's impact on air quality. The USACE relied on data supplied by La Capra 
Associates, a Cape Wind-hired contractor and listed out the predicted amount of 
C02 offset that the wind farm could achieve in a given year, using the year of 
2000 as a benchmark. The predicted amount was 949,000 tons of C02. The 
USACE concluded that the project would help reduce regional emission without 
further elaboration. The USACE' s assessment was later criticized by project 
opponents as biased. Under the DOl's jurisdiction, the MMS separated climate 
change from air quality and treated the project's impact on climate and 
meteorology as a separate category. Rather than using information supplied by 
the project's contractors, the MMS relied on ISO New England's calculation, 
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which became available in 2005. ISO New England was a regional consortium of 
power generators. Based on ISO' s calculation, the C02 offset that Cape Wind 
could achieve was about 0.88 million tons per year, an amount similar to and 
slightly below La Capra's 2003 calculation. The DOl concluded that the operation 
of the wind farm would have negligible impact on the climate. The DOl's entire 
discussion of the project's impact on climate was less than two pages in the 800-
page final EIS. · 
In the public discourse, climate change was a major point of argument in 
favor of the project. In public hearings, the project's potential for reversing the 
climate change was consistently cited as a reason to support the project. In all the 
three sets of hearings (2002, 2004, 2008), all comments on climate change took a 
favorable position on the project. No negative or neutral comment was identified. 
Though it was mentioned only 4 times in the 2002 hearings, the participants' 
interest in climate change increased dramatically.in the subsequent hearings. It 
was cited 44 times in 2004 and 38 times in 2008. In the early stage (2002), some 
participant asked the regulatory to consider the "the effects of global warming and 
higher sea levels on the economy of the Cape and Island". (See Table 4.9) In subsequent 
hearings (2004, 2008), the support became more direct and pronounced. Some 
participants believed that when "sea rises and the islands wash away ... there's no 
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Nantucket Sound". As a response to the opposition, one participant asked, "what 
does it benefit us to save our Sound if we lose our planet?". Some invoked the 
image of intergenerational justice and visualized the conversation with their 
grandchildren when asked "why our (ocean) view is more important than the beaches 
they never got to enjoy because sea level rose due to global warming". Some discussed 
"species extinction here and quite possibly our own". Some voiced their full support 
to the project "for other reason than that it will provide sustainable energy that can help 
to slow global warming". Some were hopeful that "maybe some day we will even make 
NIMBY (Not in my backyard) stand for Now In My Day (sic)". Such comments in 
hearing were picturesque and rhetorical. They appealed to personal emotions 
and social construction of meaning. But they did not utilize scientific evidence, 
nor did they point to specific courses of action that the regulator or the developer 
could effect. These comments were significantly divorced from the scope and 
standard supported by the regulatory regime. 
The issue of climate change illustrated how a novel opportunity emerging 
from a novel technology could not be fully recognized by the old problem-
solving structure. It was acknowledged in the general public as a key driver for 
developing this wind farm. But the potential benefits could not be fully 
discussed because there was no regulatory structure to support that discussion. 
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No widely accepted yardstick existed that would enable the regulator to conduct 
a full, convincing cost-benefit analysis into the environmental benefits the project 
might create. Also, because of this lack of standard, the already limited scope of 
assessment was under criticism by project opponents. In all, the potential of the 
project's benefits on climate for positively influencing the regulatory decision 
was not fully realized. The enthusiastic support from the public discourse was 
not fully appreciated in the formal regulatory regime. 
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Public Resource for Private Enterprise 
The issue of Public Resource for Private Enterprise exemplified how a 
social justice issue was resolved through a regulatory change by a stable 
problem-solving structure. The issue started off as highly controversial. Once the 
relevant regulatory change was effected in a way consistent with socially 
accepted precedents, the issue was resolved. 
The issue of Public Resource for Private Enterprise was concerned with 
the developer taking public property (the ocean waters) for gains of a private 
enterprise without paying a fair lease. At the early stage of project development, 
no industry-specific regulation existed. There was no legal basis for any 
government agency to calculate, collect, and distribute lease from Cape Wind, 
should the wind farm be built. This issue became rather controversial in the 
public discourse. The 2002 and 2004 public hearings were filled with heated 
debates around fairness and justice. (See Table 4.10) Some participants said, "We 
simply cannot allow 'squatters' rights' to determine the future of Nantucket Sound". 
Some called the project would "heist it (the waterway) from the citizens". Others 
rejected the project prospect altogether, even with a lease. "Nantucket Sound isn't 
for sale. It's not even for lease. It can't be." A participant even invoked the U.S. 
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Another participant reverted to the proponents' often-used "vision" metaphor in 
saying "It's not the view; it's not the vision. It's the money. Nantucket Sound is not for 
sale." Many other comments featured strong words such as "dismay", 
"despoiling public land", "taking free of charge", and "betray public trust". 
Interestingly, a participant compared Cape Wind with Enron and suspected 
there was "some kind of hanky~panky". However, there were also a number of 
comments that sought to support the project and refute the opponents. Some 
participants questioned if same logic applied to fisheries, "who gave them the right 
to own the ocean?". "Can we say that anybody who is fishing out there commercially 
should pay us moneys [sic] because they're making an income off of it?" 
The 2005 amendments to the EPA and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act fundamentally altered the legal context and effectively resolved this 
controversy. These 2005 amendments recognized offshore wind energy and 
named the MMS under the DOl as the lead regulator. The MMS was charged 
with formalizing the rules and procedure for regulating the right-of-way, 
easement, and lease payment for developing alternative energy sources on outer 
continental shelf. The DOl had a long history of managing rights-of-way and 
leases. The new rules were built on these past precedents in similarly large-scale 
construction projects. The rules were finalized in April 2009 (Title 30 CFR, parts 
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250, 285, 290) and became effective in June 2009. The developer agreed to comply. 
Before the 2009 publication of the rules, the debate on this issue was still 
active, though to a much less extent, in the public discourse. At this stage, it was 
already well known that the regulator was working on industry-specific rules 
and would include a mechanism for collecting leases. In the 2008 public hearings, 
the opponents continued to express doubt about using the developer's use of 
public resources .. One participant was concerned about the precedent Cape Wind 
would set, and said, "one shudders to think of the next national treasure to be usurped 
by the interests of venture capitalists". Another participant "implored" the regulator 
and cited a poem, "When in life you are bereft and have two pennies left, use one for 
bread and with the dole buy hyacinths for the soul." However, overall, the debate 
already started to subside. 
Since the 2009 publication of rules, this controversy exited from the public 
discourse. The issue of Public Resource for Private Enterprise was resolved. 
In summary, this issue illustrated how a novel social justice issue 
emerging from a novel business form could be effectively resolved by innovating 
on stable problem-solving structures. The issue arose out of a legal void and 
touched on fundamental principles of fairness, justice, and public-private 
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relationships. This issue, if unresolved, had the potential of derailing the entire 
project. This issue called for a regulatory change and the mechanisms, processes, 
and precedents for effecting such a change in the matters of collecting lease were 
well established in American regulatory regime. What it required was to 
innovate on this stable mechanism and make it applicable to the new context. 
Once the new rules were finalized and entered into the federal repertoire of 
regulations, the debate subsided and exited. 
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Impact on Fisheries 
The issue of fishery was both a scientific issue and a social justice issue. It 
involved direct economic interests with commercial fishing, an important 
economic sector and a long tradition of practice in Cape Cod. The issue never 
resolved through an emergent, less stable problem-solving structure, despite the 
availability of scientific data. 
The issue of fishery was over how the project would affect fishing 
activities in the area. Fishery resources were regulated and managed by an 
assortment of federal and state agencies, including NOAA Fisheries, New 
England Fisheries Management Council, Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management 
Council, Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Council, and Massachusetts 
Department of Fish and Game - Division of Marine Fisheries (MassDMF) (MMS 
FEIS 2008). In other words, the regulating authority was not concentrated but 
distributed . 
. Scientific data on the fish resources were relatively well documented. Of 
the 1060 reference citations in the three versions of EIS, 52 references were 
related to fishery resources. The majority (44 articles; 85%) were literature review 
on prior scientific studies. Of the eight original studies, the developer contracted 
134 
six; the other two were conducted by other government agencies. The regulator's 
analysis primarily relied on data from NOAA and MassDMF in a mixture of 
literature review and on-site studies, some of which were based on 30 year 
longitudinal research. 
Despite the availability of scientific data, fishermen were not convinced. 
After the publication of the two draft EIS' s (2004, 2008) with progressively more 
information, fishermen's ·opposition in fact increased. In MMS' s final EIS, the 
regulator gave an impact rating of "from none to minor" to the impact on 
fisheries, with "moderate" effects on vessel traffic. Fishermen strongly contended 
this assessment. 
From the fishermen's perspective, the issue was about preserving income, 
livelihood, and a traditional way of life. The opposition came from individual 
and organized commercial fishing interests. Commercial fishing in the Cape Cod 
area was organized through a coalition of fishermen's associations. 
Massachusetts Fishermen's Partnership was the umbrella organization that 
represented 18 local fishermen's associations. 
Since the early stage of the project development, fishermen's opposition 
was heard in public discourse. (See Table 4.11) In 2002 and 2004 hearings, the 
135 
fishermen saw Nantucket Sound as "nursery" and "one of the richest fishing 
grounds in North America", having "tremendous economic importance". Later in the 
permitting process, the opponents started to invoke the notions of tradition and 
intergenerational justice. One participant said tin a 2004 hearing that he was a 
"12th generation Cape Codder". With his "grandfather and his grandfather all fished 
Nantucket Sound", Nantucket was the "life blood of my family". The wind farm 
would "forever adversely impact us". Another participant in 2008 even mentioned 
that his family has "lived on Martha 's Vineyard since 1642, and many ... were 
commercial fishermen". Many key phrases characterized fishermen's comments in 
hearings: "taken away", "generations", "not safe", "flawed", "have to pay", 
"livelihood", "scraped clean", and "destroyed". Nonetheless, there were also 
occasional comments in hearings made by non-fishermen in support of the 
project. Such comments sometimes questioned the fairness of fishermen's 
practice: "why are we still using dragging technology? ... you're destroying the habitat". 
Other supporters invoked the project's environment benefits as compared to "the 
impact of fossil fuel on this fishing industry's economy". Yet others pointed out the 
turbine structure would actually improved fishing. Some would simply pointed 
out Horseshoe Shoal was too shallow and there was "very little fishing activity" 
there anyway. 
136 
Fishermen's opposition persisted outside hearings and beyond the 2010 
DOl approval. After the DOl approval, the developer sought direct negotiation 
with fishermen's interests. It managed to sign a settlement with a local 
association, Martha's Vineyard Fishermen. However, the vast majority of 
fishermen's organization in the area and in Massachusetts at large remained 
opposed, with no signs of reconciliation. 
In summary, the issue of fisheries was supposed to rely on science, 
involving studies on fish species, seasonality, and catchment technologies. This 
sector governed by reasonable but not highly enforceable laws and regulations. 
The regulatory authority was not concentrated on a single source .as in aviation 
but, rather, distributed across an assortment of federal, state, and local 
authorities with limited law enforcement capacities. Moreover, fisheries were 
directly related to tangible economic interests and traditional ways of life. It was 
a mode of production that used public resources for private enterprise in a rule-
based, socially accepted manner. When this way of production and lifestyle was 
challenged by an outsider that was to use the same swath of · resources, 
contestation grew and persisted. Though fundamentally scientific in nature, the 
issue became socially contested when economic interests and the notion of 
fairness came into play. The issue of fisheries highlighted how a social justice 
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issue might never be resolved through a less stable, stringent problem-solving 
structure, regardless of the availability of scientific data. 
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Visual Impact 
The issue of the project's impact on ocean view was a severely contested 
issue. It illustrated how a social justice issue, when no effective problem-solving 
structure was available, might become political with no clear path for mitigation 
or . resolution. Such an issue lacked an established scientific method for 
investigation and was not governed by any specific, enforceable regulations. 
The issue of the visual impact was about how the project would affect the 
visual beauty of the ocean horizon as result of the installation of wind turbines. 
There was no specific regulatory body that specializes in evaluating the visual 
· impact. The MMS primarily drew upon the Massachusetts Historical 
Commission as well as the NEP A. The regulator sought a relatively scientific 
approach and devised a protocol. The regulator selected viewpoints that would 
be most affected by the project, created simulation, assessed the level of impact. 
Studies were based on a combination of on-site visitations and digital 
simulations. The final assessment was that the impact would be "minor" in 
general and only become "major" when in close proximity to the turbines. 
In the public discourse, in contrast with the regulator's approach, this 
issue was under constant, heated debate. In public hearings, opinions were 
143 
divided as to whether the visual impact would be positive or negative. (See Table 
4.12) Interestingly, while there were still neutral comments in 2002 and 2004 
hearing, no neutral comment was identified in 2008 hearings, suggesting 
participants had taken positions with two competing coalitions. On the positive 
side, proponents believed that the turbines on the ocean horizon would be an 
"attraction", "beautiful", "majestic", "glorious" and "mesmerizing". Other 
proponents attached symbolic meaning to the visual effects. For example, a 
member of the proponent advocacy group Clean Power Now commented, "It's 
not really the view. It's the wonderful, beautiful vision!". Other supporters believed 
that the turbines would "blow us into a future less hopeless". A 2008 hearing 
participant, when responding to the size comparison of turbines with the Statue 
of Liberty, commented that turbines were the "new symbol of freedom and a brighter 
sustainable future, not a giant statue holding a torch over a polluted harbor". 
On the negative side, opponents made strong comments, often invoking 
personal emotions. One 2004 hearing participant said she was "brought to tears 
(after looking at view simulations) .... The only thing that has made me feel as sick as I 
felt today when I saw those pictures was chemotherapy and that's anything but benign." 
Some called the project "Coney Island", "a summer playground out there at night", 
"caged in a steel forest", "a panoramic nighttime view of the industrialization of 
144 
Nantucket Sound", "a senseless act of destructiveness", "a water-based factory ... (that) 
turns my stomach", and "giant dollar signs". 
The issue of visual impact persisted beyond the 2010 DOl approval. There 
were no signs of reconciliation, nor an obvious path for achieving any 
reconciliation. The local community remained split in opinion. 
The issue of visual impact illustrated how a social justice issue, when no 
effective problem-solving structure was available, could become highly contested 
and persistent. The visual impact was an aesthetic issue in nature. There was no 
intrinsic standard for evaluating beauty. Aesthetics was individually subjective, 
socially constructed, and politically pluralistic. In the case of Cape Wind, the 
regulator sought a quasi-scientific approach and gave a regulatory assessment. 
The debate in the public discourse, however, thrived and persisted outside and 
beyond the regulatory process. There was little latitude either the regulator or 
the developer could exercise in order to effectively reconcile such differences in 
aesthetic perceptions. 
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
The original motivation for this study was to understand why some 
nascent industries do not emerge. What are the factors that delay or prevent 
industry emergence and how? I studied the 13-year history of Cape Wind's 
project development (2001-2014). As America's first proposal for an offshore 
wind farm, Cape Wind went through a long, difficulty process of securing 
regulatory permits amid shifting regulatory contexts, rising social contestation, 
and changing market conditions. Despite permitting success, the project still 
faced difficulty in business development as well as ongoing contestation with no 
clear path for reconciliation. Cape Wind is a multi-faceted story that illustrates 
how the interplay of regulatory, social, and economic factors may delay or 
prevent project development. Specifically, I identified the structural 
disengagement between the regulator and the public in their attention, interests, 
and values as a major barrier to project development and industry emergence. 
This chapter discusses the contributions and limitations of this study. I 
will first discuss contributions to our understanding of industry emergence, 
institutions, social movement, and innovation. !will then discuss how this study 
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may inform practice for entrepreneurs, project developers, and policy makers. I 
conclude this chapter by reflecting on the limitations and pinpointing directions 
for future research. 
5.1 Contribution to Academia 
This study contributes to academia in four areas. It contributes to 
economic sociology by identifying the factors that may inhibit industry 
emergence and emphasizing the effects of regulation as a key source of barrier. 
This study also contributes to institutional literature by marrying structure and 
values and arguing that structure enables and constrains the action that translate 
values into socioeconomic outcomes. Third, this study contributes to social 
movement literature by demonstrating that certain kinds of issues are more 
effective than others when strategically used to (de)legitimate a frame and 
advance a given cause. Fourth, this study contributes to innovation literature by 
proposing four types of innovation as potential directions of change to dismantle 
the four kinds of resistance to industry emergence. The rest of this subsection 
discuss these contribution in detail. 
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5.1.1 Factors that Inhibits Industry Emergence 
Cape Wind demonstrates that industry emergence may be inhibited by a 
systemic 'interplay of multiple factors rather than a single determinant. Cape 
Wind's lengthy, difficulty project development was result of interactions of 
regulatory, social, technological, economic; political, and cultural factors. Each 
factor was related to other factors, augmenting each other. No single factor was a 
dominant determinant. These factors jointly created a context that was hostile to 
project development and industry emergence at large. 
On the regulatory front, the complex and fluid regulatory conditions 
hindered project development. First, Cape Wind experienced regulatory 
conditions evolving from a regulatory void to rule making. In the early stage, the 
lack of regulation rendered the regulatory process incapable of addressing many 
fundamental issues, particularly those related to jurisdiction and lease collection. 
This regulatory void opened up a wide window of opportunity for the 
opponents to effectively challenge the legitimacy of the project. 
Second, regulatory change in the middle of a permitting process caused 
repeat efforts, resulting in a longer process, higher costs, and more exposure to 
market risks. Though the 2005 amendment to the EPA clarified issues of 
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jurisdiction and lease collection, the jurisdiction handover from the USACE to 
the DOl meant that more than three years of efforts would have to be repeated. 
This increased the developer's expenditure on conducting scientific studies: 
either new studies were required or certain studies were to be repeated using 
different methods. A longer permitting lead-time also increased the developer's 
exposure to market fluctuations, as business conditions might change, adding 
uncertainty to the project's economic feasibility. 
Third, the lack of effective adjudicative mechanisms in the regulatory 
regime left Cape Wind in a quagmire of contestation despite a regulatory 
approval. The regulatory regime valued the principle of public participation and 
opened up the permitting process to the public. However, once issues emerged 
in the public discourse, the regulatory regime did not possess the structure, 
procedures, and standards to effectively adjudicate on many of the issues. The 
regulators and the public were disengaged in their attention, interests, and 
values. Those umesolved issues survived the permitting process and thrived in 
alternative channels such as courts of law. This quagmire of contestation 
complicated and further delayed Cape Wind's efforts to develop business 
relations with investors, buyers, and suppliers. 
154 
On the social front, contestation and politicization of issues had been a 
major source of resistance to project development. First, the project proposal 
instigated contention among a wide array of interest groups and local 
communities, with consensus hard to come by. The Nantucket region was a 
highly utilized geographical area, with dense residential communities and 
competing uses of resources. The potential insertion of a novel, large-scale 
industrial establishment into such a high-density, high-use area caused wide 
apprehension and divided communities. The very fact that a commercial 
proposal divided communities made the project itself controversial. 
Second, organized competition sustained ongoing contestation, rendering 
reconciliation difficult. The two leading advocacy groups, the APNS and Clean 
Power Now, functioned successfully as umbrella organizations that united 
otherwise unrelated interest groups into competing coalitions. Coalitions 
reduced the window of latitude for individual groups to directly negotiate, 
compromise, change positions, or exit the competition. Social contestation 
evolved from a matter of individual concern to social movement and local 
politics. 
Third, politicization of social contestation delayed project development. 
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Intense, organized engagement with the regulatory process, by speaking at 
hearings and submitting comments, overwhelmed the regulator's capacity. 
Intense contestation contributed to the regulator's hesitancy to reach a decision, 
delaying the permitting process. Ongoing politicization, often publicly featured 
in mass media, also affected the developer's ability to build relations with 
investors, as controversy could be viewed as a social liability. 
On the technological front, the emerging technology was a major source 
of regulatory, economic, and technical uncertainty. With fast changing technical 
designs and limited precedents of implementation, it was difficult to assess the 
performance and business outlook of a given technology. For Cape Wind, the 
regulatory regime did not possess proven standards to evaluate the proposed 
design on its own or over other alternatives. More importantly, this lack of 
proven standards translated into the regulator's inability to convince 
stakeholders, and the public at large, of the regulator's assessment. 
In addition, evolving technical designs in the 13-year period (2001-2014) 
had undermined the Cape Wind's economic and social assumptions. The 
developer's choice of turbine design was appropriate in 2001. But newer designs, 
particularly direct-drive and deeper-water models, had later matured and 
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became viable. These newer models were more efficient and could deliver better 
economic results. They also could be sited further from shore, avoiding many of 
the contested issues Cape Wind had faced. 
Moreover, the design of choice was tied to the regulatory permit that the 
developer obtained. To change the design or choose an alternative site, the 
developer might have to repeat the regulatory process. This effectively locked up 
the developer with an obsolete technology, leading to ever-decreasing economic 
value and waning interest from investors. 
On the economic front, changes in the market environment challenged the 
project's economic feasibility. From an energy market perspective, Cape Wind's 
project assumed that the U.S. energy supply would continue to rely on foreign 
import with unpredictable price fluctuation. The project was proposed two 
months after the September 11 attack, followed by market uncertainty about 
America's energy supply and a political urgency to achieve energy independence. 
However, unforeseen by the developer, between 2001 and 2014, the U.S. saw 
unprecedented growth in domestic production of crude oil and natural gas, 
largely due to use of hydraulic fracturing and development of Bakken crude and 
Mercellus shale gas. The energy market stabilized with ever-decreasing reliance 
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on foreign import. With an abundance of cheap gas, Cape Wind's offer of rates 
was unattractive to buyers, even after considering tax rebates and the promised 
long-term price predictability. 
From a supply market perspective, Cape Wind's estimate of construction 
cost grew from -$1 billion to -$2.6 billion from 2001 to 2014. During the 10-year 
permitting process, the cost for equipment and construction had grown 
significantly. This was the economic toll of the lengthy regulatory lead-time. The 
rise of cost translated into a longer breakeven forecast, higher rates, and a lower 
profit margin, making the overall project unattractive to investors. 
On the political front, national and local political conditions affected the 
project development, with mixed implications on the project's progression. On a 
national level, recognition of climate change and support for environmentalism 
had gained increased momentum in America's political arena. The September 11 
attack and the subsequent wars kept energy security and independence as an 
ongoing national objective. The 2008 financial crisis and economic recession 
brought the topic of creating American jobs to top of the national agenda. This 
was coupled with a sense of urgency to compete with emerging economies in 
innovation and growth. Overall, the political environment was becoming ready 
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to embrace and support the development of renewable energy such as the 
offshore wind energy industry. The 2010 BP oil spill, as a crisis event, 
precipitated a final, favorable decision on Cape Wind. However, Cape Wind also 
faced opposition from key national political figures such as Senator Edward 
Kennedy. Senator Kennedy's profound influence on the Democratic Party and on 
the Congress became a barrier for other politicians to openly endorse Cape Wind. 
This source of resistance at the Congress level did not subside until Senator 
Kennedy's death. 
On a local level, the political climate of Massachusetts and Cape Cod in 
particular also affected Cape Wind's progression. Progressive liberalism 
characterized Massachusetts' political climate. The residents of Cape Cod had a 
long tradition of community engagement and public participation. Cape Wind 
attracted local interests, ignited dialogue, and spurred social movement activities. 
High levels of public engagement, community outreach, and social mobilization 
educated the public of the pros and cons of the project. However, public 
participation overwhelmed the regulator's capacity. As the regulator was 
obligated to respond to each comment, intense engagement with the permitting 
process, in effect, delayed the process, a consequence unintended by the 
proponents in particular. 
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In addition, advocacy groups' access to large political and financial 
resources sustained organized opposition. The Cape Cod communities included 
wealthy and influential residents. When advocacy groups obtained these 
individuals' support, they had access to large political and financial resources. 
Many of the opposing speakers at hearings were members of the federal and 
state legislature, suggesting the extent of political capital the opponents could 
mobilize. After the DOl approvat the APNS, the lead opponent group, continued 
to secure large financial resources to fund repeated lawsuits against the project. 
Access to large resources partially explained why organized opposition was able 
to persist. 
Taken together, the Cape Wind project was a multi-faceted story. A 
combination of regulatory, technical, social, economic, and political factors 
interacted with each other and prevented the project's success and industry 
emergence. No single determinant could otherwise offer an adequate 
explanation. The interplay of these factors created a market context that was 
hostile to project development and to the nascent offshore wind energy industry 
at large. 
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While traditional strategy studies had treated industry emergence as a 
black box, recent institutional analysts have sought to understand how industries 
emerge from cultural and institutional innovations. However, we understood 
poorly why some industries did not emerge and why. This study started to 
answer these questions by close examination of an extreme, negative example. 
Cape Wind, as the first project proposed in a nascent offshore wind energy 
industry, failed to emerge 13 years since its conception. A complex interplay of 
regulatory, technical, social, economic, and political factors prevented its 
emergence. These factors acted alone and in conjunction. 
While institutional analysts suggest that cultural, institutional innovations 
induce entrepreneurial opportunities and industry emergence, this study 
suggests that institutional innovation is not sufficient, but one of the many 
predictor variables. Other factors, such as technology, economics, or political 
context, could delay or block an emerging industry in its infancy, despite 
institutional innovation and collective action. These factors may or may not 
contribute positively to industry emergence, but they can certainly play a role in 
effectively preventing an industry from emerging. Industry emergence not only 
requires the right market condition; it also requires the absence of effective 
blocking mechanisms, unless it possesses the capability of mitigating the 
161 
resistance. An industry does not emerge from one-hand clapping but from 
simultaneously executing innovation while managing resistance. 
One key finding to note is the role of regulation in inhibiting industry 
emergence. Among the five factors (regulatory, technical, social, economic, and 
political) identified as sources of resistance, regulation plays the role as the 
primary inhibitor. For entrepreneurs to develop a project of a nascent industry, a 
key scarce resource is time. Time is the underlying factor that determines the 
technical and economic conditions for a successful market entry. A long 
regulatory lead-time increases the risk that the right technical and economic 
conditions may have elapsed while actual and opportunity costs have 
accumulated in the process. The Cape Wind case is a typical example. The 10-
year permitting process meant that the fundamental market conditions had 
changed significantly from the time when the project was conceived. However, 
the developer had incurred considerable sunk costs, which might have induced 
escalation of commitment, even when the market conditions could hardly justify 
continuance. This left the developer in a quagmire of difficult choices. 
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5.1.2 Contribution to Institutional Studies 
While institutional analysts had focused on logics in explaining 
institutional innovation and industry emergence, my study suggests that both 
structure and logics play an important role. It is the duality of structure and 
logics that links institutional innovation with industry emergence. 
In the Cape Wind study, I identified two competing logics or value 
systems: science and social justice. They were the rationales that stakeholders 
appealed to when framing an issue and justifying a decision. I also identified 
variation of stability of the problem-solving structure available to a given issue. It 
ranged from stable to emergent. A stable problem-solving structure tended to 
possess more established legal specificity, standards, procedures, and proven 
precedents, as compared with emergent structures. If the logics provide the basis 
for legitimation, structures are the mechanisms for enabling action. Logics and 
structures operate together to make change happen. 
The combined consideration of structure and logics offers a framework for 
categorizing issues, areas of life stakeholders deem relevant. Each issue is 
potentially a source of resistance as well as an opportunity for change. I 
identified four categories of issues: scientific issues requiring stable problem-solving 
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structure, scientific issues requiring emergent problem-solving structure, social justice 
issues requiring stable problem-solving structure, and social issues requiring emergent 
problem-solving structure. 
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Figure 5.1 Four Kinds of Potential Resistance to Industry Emergence 
In the Cape Wind project, each issue was a source of resistance that 
required assessment, mitigation, and resolution. The regulator and the public 
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diverged in their attention, interests, and values when considering what issues to 
include and how to solve them. While the regulator focused on scientific issues 
requiring stable structures and, to a less extent, on justice issues requiring 
emergent structures, the public's interests were broader in scope and 
emphasized on issues of social justice rather than science. This disengagement 
was structural, as the regulatory regime was not equipped with the structural 
mechanisms necessary for addressing the public's scope of interests in its entirety. 
Structural disengagement delays and prevents industry emergence. 
Structural disengagement refers to the lack of convergence, given a specific 
domain of life, among relevant stakeholders in their value systems and their 
choice of problem-solving methods. In a regulatory context, structure 
disengagement reflects two kinds of, potentially simultaneous, divergence: in the 
value systems that justify an outcome (ends) and in the methods (means) for 
reaching that outcome. 
When the regulator's problem-solving methods are not commensurate 
with the nature and scope of resistance that the regulator's participatory 
principle invites, the function of regulation breaks down. In other words, 
structural engagement occurs when the regulatory regime does not possess the 
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effective structural capability for adjudicating on the stakeholders' interests 
invited into the regulatory process by the regulator itself. When this happens, the 
stakeholders' interests are only partially addressed, leaving the rest of concerns 
unresolved. Structural engagement leaves a business venture in a quagmire of 
ongoing resistance despite regulatory approval. 
Structural disengagement manifests how structure and values operate 
together in inhabiting project development and industry emergence. The 
regulatory regime values the logics of both science and social justice. When a 
business innovation seeks to emerge, the regulator upholds a participatory 
principle and opens up the regulatory process to the public. However, the 
regulator's structural gearing is developed primarily to resolve scientific issues. 
The structural capability for operating under the social justice logic is poorly 
developed, leaving the regulator incompetent in fulfilling values through actions. 
On the other hand, the members of the public also believe in both science and 
justice. However, without adequate structural support from either . within 
regulation or from another source (e.g. independent studies on birds), 
stakeholders do not have the effective capability of directing the regulator 
toward an actionable outcome. Beliefs in values stay rhetorical with no action or 
result. Institutional innovation does not stop at logics and legitimation. Lack of 
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effective structural support delays and prevents innovation from materializing 
into a new business form. 
5.1.3 Contribution to Innovation Studies 
The sources of resistance are also opportunities for change. Now that I 
have discussed the factors and mechanisms that prevent industry emergence, the 
next question is what it takes to better support industry emergence. An 
understanding of what inhibits innovation informs what stimulates innovation. 
Drawing on the lessons learned from the Cape Wind study, I propose a 
theoretical topology of four kinds of innovation. Each kind of innovation 
represents a way of combination of logics and structures. This speaks to both 
institutionalists and structuralists that a holistic lens on innovation should 
consider structure and content simultaneously. 
I propose four kinds of innovation on a framework of two dimensions. 
One dimension considers science and social justice as two competing logics for 
solving problems and justifying claims. Depending on the content of a given 
problem, the required innovation could be either scientific innovation to address a 
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scientific issue, or a policy innovation to address a social justice issue. The second 
dimension considers the relative stability of the problem-solving structure. 
Depending on the stability of the available structure, innovation could be 
innovation on existing structure or innovation for new structure. The combination of 
these two dimensions yields four kinds of innovation. 
Science 
Scientific Innovation 
For Ne\V Structures 
Scientific Innovation 
On Existing Structures 
Emergwt 
Stmcture 
Stable 
Structure 
Policy Innovation 
For New Structures 
Policy Innovation 
On Existing Structures 
Social just-ice 
Figure 5.2 Four Kinds of Innovation to Dismantle Barriers to Emergence 
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First, Scientific Innovation on Existing Structures occurs when the content of 
innovation is scientific in nature and the methods, standards, and procedures for 
the subject matter at hand are established, tested, and accepted by the relevant 
expert community. Innovation of this kind generalizes proven standards into a 
new context. The tasks are to adjust known methods and/or collect new data to 
meet the requirements of new circumstances. Once this inquiry is complete, the 
quality of the innovation is easy to assess and the output enters into a cumulative 
body of knowledge. 
For example, the issue of Cape Wind's impact on birds belonged to this 
kind of innovation. Ornithology was a well-established scientific discipline with 
proven methods and standards. But little was known about the bird species 
particular to Nantucket Sound. The task of innovation was to apply known 
research methods, collect local data, and fill in the gaps. Once the findings were 
validated, the issue was resolved. New knowledge of the avifauna of Nantucket 
entered into the canon of ornithology. 
Second, Scientific Innovation for New Structures occurs when the content of 
innovation is scientific in nature but no methods, standards, and procedures 
have been established or have matured to the extent that is widely accepted by 
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the relevant expert community. The scientific discipline on the subject matter is 
still emerging. Innovation of this kind is to create and stabilize standards by 
developing scientific knowledge and by building consensus in the expert 
community. 
For example, the issue of climate change required this kind of innovation. 
As a scientific subject matter, the study of climate change was still emerging and 
widely accepted standards did not yet exist. For a regulator to competently 
discuss climate change when evaluating a business project, it would first require 
wide consensus among scientists on a national, if not global, scale. Only when 
standards are stabilized in the scientific community can policymakers and 
regulators start to adopt and utilize those standards, as immature adoption 
would only lead to criticism and litigation. 
Third, Policy Innovation on Existing Structures occurs when existing policy 
structure is re-contextualized in order to better mediate social justice. The word 
"policy" takes a broad meaning and includes any deliberate government 
directive. Policy includes laws, regulations, rules, or administrative orders. 
Innovation of this kind generalizes an established practice into a novel context. 
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The tasks are to amend the existing policy so that it becomes applicable to new 
circumstances. 
For example, the issue of public resource for private enterprise required 
this kind of innovation. Social controversy emerged because there was no legal 
basis to collect lease from a private developer for using public waters. However, 
lease collection by government for private use of public resources was a well-
established practice. It took a legal change to recognize offshore wind energy 
development, so that the existing lease collection practice could be applied to this 
new context. Once the new rules were in place, the controversy was resolved. 
Fourth, Policy Innovation for New Structures is required when entirely new 
policy structure needs to be created in order to mediate social justice. The new 
circumstances are so novel that no existing policy is available or could be 
amended to accommodate the novelty and render justice. New laws, regulations, 
or practices may need to be created. Alternatively, new practices may be 
improvised for the immediate needs in lieu of a formal legal change. The 
common task is to design a new problem-solving structure for addressing 
novelty and mediating justice. 
For example, many of the Cape Wind's social justice issues, such as the 
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impact on fisheries, tourism, or ocean view, required policy innovation for new 
structures. These issues were not only novel but grew out of stakeholders' 
divergent perspectives on fairness . There was no inherently right answer. No 
regulatory apparatus was available, or could be amended, to help adjudicate on 
these novel issues. This would require creation of new problem-solving 
structures that are tailored to the new circumstances. 
The potential of each kind of innovation to emerge varies by the degree of 
sharedness in science and policy. Degree of sharedness here refers to the extent 
of social consensus on the nature of the issue and the methods for resolving it. A 
higher degree of sharedness signals more convergence in the clarity of defining 
and solving a given problem; a lower degree of sharedness means more 
divergence and ambiguity. 
At a high level of sharedness, science and policy tend to converge. As in 
the example of aviation, not only the scientific data and methods were available, 
the scientific rationality was integrated with the policy framework with 
designated authorities and procedures. In this highly convergent socio-technical 
space, effectiveness of action largely depends on conformance with the extant 
standards and procedures; highly innovative action is less likely to emerge. 
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The opposite is the example of Cape Wind's visual impact. Neither 
scientific data nor methods were readily available. There was low level of social 
sharedness in terms of the definition of the issue and the methods for solving it. 
This socio-technical space is poorly supported by the existing scientific and 
policy infrastructures. The elements of science and policy are highly divergent. 
Innovation in such a poorly defined social space is highly likely as any action 
may be considered new and innovative. However, the potential of effectiveness 
that these innovative actions could achieve is also limited, as effectiveness here is 
poorly defined and measured. 
The middle level of sharedness in science and policy infrastructures offer 
the most potential for effective innovation, as in the examples of Cape Wind's 
impact on fisheries and birds. In this middle level, certain elements of structural 
support is present in both science and policy, but it not in a highly convergent 
state. Novelty from a new enterprise, such as a new industry project, may trigger 
search functions to innovate on existing standards in order to fill any void. 
Innovative action in this space may or may not induce effective outcome. As in 
the case of birds, the stakeholders were able to achieve consensus out of common 
reliance on scientific methods and data. When data became available, the 
stakeholder's shared belief in science led to convergence in opinions. Yet that 
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was not the case in the issue of fisheries. Though scientific methods and data 
might as well be available, convergence of opinion was not achieved as the 
economic stakes in the fisheries led the issue more toward a social justice debate 
than a scientific inquiry. 
Project- Industry Boundary: An Innovation Perspective 
The four kinds of innovation apply differently to project- and industry-
level efforts, with some innovation more applicable at the industry-level. 
Scientific innovation for new structures and policy innovation on existing structures 
are out of scope of any single project, take place only at the industry levet and do 
not allow for project-specific improvisation in lieu of a formal systemic change. 
In comparison, scientific innovation on existing structures and policy innovation for 
new structures could take place at both the project- and industry-level. The 
different loci of the four kinds of innovation explain the scenario whereby a 
single project may succeed in its own permitting process, the nascent industry as 
a whole still faces structural challenges if industry-level innovation does not take 
place. 
Scientific innovation on existing structures and policy innovation for new 
structures could take place at both project and industry levels. The first kind is to 
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apply existing scientific methods and standards to a new context, usually 
requiring minor adjustment of the methods to fit local circumstances as well as 
collection of new data. This could effectively take place at a local and project-
specific level, with results useful at the industry level as well. For example, the 
study of avifauna in the Cape Wind project was a local exercise using existing 
methods. The results were specific to the project but also useful as a reference for 
other projects of the industry. 
Policy innovation for new structures could also take place at both project and 
industry levels. Though a formal problem-solving mechanism is conceivably 
created at a macro, industry level, this kind of innovation does allow for local 
improvising and "muddling through" for the immediate local needs in lieu of a 
formal systemic change. This gives the innovator (e.g. a regulator) some 
flexibility of moving a current task forward without being held back by a macro-
level change. The downside is that, in the absence of a systemic change, the local 
issue may not be fully resolved and other similar projects would need to face the 
same challenge without effective, formal recourse. For example, the issue of the 
visual impact in the Cape Wind project faced such a challenge. In the absence of 
formal methods and standards for evaluating visual impact, the regulator 
improvised on certain techniques (e.g. simulation, site visitations) and produced 
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impact ratings. Though the result was contentious, the regulator fulfilled the 
immediate needs for having an assessment. However, without creating and 
stabilizing a formal standard at the industry level, regulators are likely to face 
similar challenges and contention in other projects in the offshore wind energy 
industry. 
In contrast, scientific innovation for new structures and policy innovation on 
existing structures are out of the scope of any single project, take place solely at 
the industry level, and do not allow for local improvising. They are exclusively 
industry-level variables. Scientific innovation for new structures entails creation of 
new scientific standards. This involves coordinated efforts in the communities of 
science, government, and business, on a national, if not international, scale. For 
new standards to be plausible and convincing, broad consensus in the expert 
community is necessary. This process is beyond the scope of a single business 
project and only takes place at national, industry, or sectorial levels. Local 
improvising only dilutes credibility. For example, the issue of climate change in 
the Cape Wind case required such innovation. How to calculate climate change 
and, more importantly, how to incorporate a project's carbon impact into the 
permitting process as a basis for evaluating its merits required new scientific 
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standards in the expert community as well as wide acceptance in the society. 
This was beyond the scope of Cape Wind or any single business proposal. 
Policy innovation on existing structure is another kind of innovation that 
requires industry-level efforts. This kind of innovation entails generalizing an 
established policy into a new context. The existing policy is already standardized 
and tested in a long series of precedents. To re-contextualize such an established 
policy involves a legal, regulatory change. Such a formal change may be 
triggered by the novelty presented by a single project, but the efforts are systemic 
and the outcome of the change bear industry-level implications. As it draws on 
established practices, this kind of innovation hinges on legality and does not 
allow for local improvising. For example, the issue of lease collection in the Cape 
Wind project required this kind of innovation. Government collection of lease for 
use of public resources by private entities was a well-established practice. In face 
of Cape Wind's proposal to use public waters for commercial energy 
development, it took a legal amendment to recognize this mode of power 
production and specify an agency as the designated regulator. This enabled the 
government to apply the lease collection practice to the novel context. Though 
the amendment was triggered by Cape Wind as the first of its kind, once the 
change was made, it was applicable to all subsequent projects in the industry. 
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Lack of the kinds of innovation exclusive to the industry level, scientific 
innovation for new structures and policy innovation on existing structures, are 
particular sources of difficulty for industry emergence. These innovations are 
outside the scope of any single project, require coordinated efforts of government, 
science, and business, and seek to effect systemic change on the status quo. As it 
is out of scope for single projects, project-specific stakeholders (e.g. regulator, 
developer, interest groups) may not have, or could justify, the resources required 
for such innovations. The scientific community may need considerable time to 
build consensus and create new standards. The legislature may face resistance 
and delay before amending a law or regulation. However, without progress in 
these systemic changes, project-specific improvising is a Band-Aid solution. A 
single project such as Cape Wind may have battled through the permitting 
process, other project proposals in the industry would likely face similar 
challenges, resulting in similar delay, uncertainty, and lost opportunities. 
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5.1.4 Contribution to Social Movement Studies 
This study contributes to social movement literature by showing that 
certain issues are more effective than others, when used strategically, in 
constructing frames, advancing a cause, or blocking opposition. 
First, scientific issues requiring stable problem-solving methods entail the 
most limited potential for influence by social movement. These issues require the 
establishment of empirical facts using agreed-on scientific methods. The 
standards, methods, and processes are highly institutionalized. This convergence 
of science and policy leaves little degree of freedom for altematives that social 
movement activities could construct and legitimate within a reasonable time 
period. 
For example, the issues of aviation and birds belong to this category. 
Despite the novelty of the project, these two issues were both scientific in nature 
and their relevant problem-solving methods are institutionalized. For aviation, 
there was a high level of convergence of science and policy; for birds, this 
convergence was less so, but the scientific methods were available. Social 
movement activities to induce change on these two issues had not been 
successful. Though advocacy groups invoked the frames and images of safety, 
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fairness, and protection of bird species, the resolution of these issues required, 
. 
and indeed followed, a separate path, either highly institutionalized under 
government authority (e.g. FAA) or subject to professional, expert investigations 
(e.g. MA Audubon). The degree of freedom that could be influenced by social 
movement was rather limited. 
Second, social justice issues requiring emergent problem-solving 
structures entail the most potential for influence by social movement. These 
issues are novel in the sense that the scientific and policy structures for studying, 
evaluating, and resolving these issues have not been developed and 
institutionalized. These issues often invoke the images of socioeconomic, inter-
and intra-generational justice. There is no single answer that could be 
methodically established to the satisfaction of all stakeholders. The contestation 
is inherently rooted in stakeholders' interests, values, and belief systems. Issues 
of this nature offer social movement the best opportunity structure to construct, 
alter, or shape symbols, codes, and frames to promote a position. The absence of 
highly institutionalized problem-solving structures renders social movement the 
potential of exercising agency and producing outcomes. 
For example, the issues of commercial fishing and .visual impact belong to 
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this category. These two issues were both successfully used by competing 
advocacy groups to promote or block Cape Wind. As the regulatory regime had 
no sufficient structural capacity to mitigate these two issues to the satisfaction of 
all stakeholders, advocacy groups strategically mobilized resources around these 
two issues. Advocacy groups invoked the frames of justice and, in so doing, 
construct narratives to legitimate or de-legitimate the project. The competing 
advocacy groups amplified their divergent interpretations. Without a stable 
evaluative structure seen in scientific issues, these mobilizations of frames and 
codes successfully polarized stakeholders and residents, leaving the project in 
persist contestation. 
Third, scientific issues requiring emergent methods and social justice 
issues requiring stable methods also offer opportunities for influence by social 
movement. These issues are industry-level variables, with less immediate degree 
of freedom but a wider scope of implications if change occurs. This would 
require social movement on an industry, and often national, level in order to 
effect the necessary changes on the infrastructure of science and policy. 
For examples, the issues of climate change and lease collection belong to 
these categories. The issue of climate change illustrates that social movement 
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around emerging scientific issues does not stop at the project level, but require 
coordinated efforts at the national level, which may or may not produce 
immediate outcomes. The issue of lease collection illustrates that invoking the 
image of justice on a novel but comparable practice . could induce the expansion 
of an existing institutional practice. 
5.3 Contribution to Practice 
In this subsection, I discuss how this study may inform policymakers and 
entrepreneurs. With practitioners as audience, this subsection is prescriptive in 
nature. 
Contribution to Policymakers 
This study contributes to policymaking in several ways. It informs 
policymakers of the systemic nature of industry emergence and lays out the 
landscape that could influence new industry development. It provides a 
framework to strategize action for fine-tuning project-level permitting rules as 
well as taking the lead in developing national, industry standards to support 
innovation. 
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First it informs policymakers of the systemic nature of industry 
emergence. Regulatory, social, technological, economic, and political factors 
could all contribute to a market environment that is hostile to innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and new industry development. For policymakers to nurture a 
new industry, such as renewable energy, this study advises against the simplistic 
economic logic of leaving it to the market. A supportive policy could consider a 
wide scope of factors and be cognizant of how regulation, technology, economics, 
society, and the political climate may interact with each other. This requires a 
systemic, holistic approach to policymaking. It calls for a collaborative process to 
engage a diverse pool of stakeholders: government agencies, industry 
representatives, scientists, and civil organizations. While it may not foresee all 
risks or balance all competing interests, a holistic, collaborative approach to 
policymaking potentially offers a framework that clarifies boundaries, priorities, 
and objectives. Such a framework would limit rhetorical debate, enable a 
constructive dialogue, and support effective issue resolution. 
Second, this study suggests that the government may play a key role in 
inducing structural changes in science and policy at the national, industry level 
to better support new industry development. This points to scientific innovation 
for new standards and policy innovation on existing practices. These two 
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structural changes are outside the scope of any single project. No actors at a 
project level could be expected to have the capacity. to drive these changes. The 
government, especially at the federal level, may play a leading role in 
coordinating efforts with the scientific community for setting the necessary 
standards for evaluating technologies that bear large-scale socioeconomic 
consequences. Once developed, these new standards could then be integrated 
into the formal regulatory procedure. For example, how to calculate the impact 
on climate change of different energy producing technologies requires such 
standard-setting efforts. More importantly, the implementation of such a 
standard as a formal criterion in the regulatory process would give different 
technologies a fair evaluation. Though any new standard is expected to be 
immature and controversial at the beginning, a federally recognized standard is 
better than nothing in mitigating contention and balancing interests. 
On the other hand, the government could also lead legal changes that re-
contextualize established practices to accommodate new industries. Lease 
collection is an example. Formal legal change is not in the capacity of any 
isolated firm, project, or regulatory agency. It requires coordinated action at the 
level of legislature. The subject matter of the necessary change is usually 
pertinent to fundamental relations of the market, society, and industry. Legal 
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recognition is not a sufficient but necessary condition to new industry 
development. 
Third, this study advises fine-tuning the current process for permitting 
offshore wind energy projects and energy projects at large. The current NEP A-
driven process excels in scientific rationality but falls short of effectiveness in 
mitigating socioeconomic issues. The process opens up to any citizen but does 
not have the capability of mitigating all the concerns. Two directions for 
improvement are possible. The first is to revisit the criteria for public 
participation. Rather than being open to every citizen, it could adopt certain 
yardsticks to restrict participation to the most directly affected, such as residents 
and business owners within a certain distance of the project or a similar yardstick. 
The second possible direction is to create standards for calculating local impacts 
and to devise a compensation mechanism. For example, a standard could be 
formalized to calculate a project's impact on fisheries and tourism, followed by 
an industry-standard mechanism to collect and distribute financial compensation 
in forms of payment or equity. Though both directions for improvement could be 
controversial at the beginning, some formal structure for issue resolution, 
facilitated by regulators and using industry standards, is conceivably more 
effective than ad hoc attempts. It is essentially to create structures, within limited 
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time and resources, to render social justice in situations dominated by divergent 
opinions and rhetorical debate. 
Contribution to Entrepreneurs 
This study contributes to entrepreneurs in renewable energy industries 
and nascent industries at large. It advises a portfolio approach to mitigate the 
diverse risks to project development. It informs project planning and 
development in anticipating issues and strategizing action. It also encourages 
coordinated lobbying efforts to induce the necessary legal and scientific change. 
First, this study lays out the sources of risks that potentially delays project 
development. A project faces regulatory, social, technological, economic, and 
political risks. Being cognizant of these risks, an entrepreneur could take a 
portfolio approach rather than relying on a single project. The portfolio may 
include projects of a variety of jurisdictional locations, technical models, or 
socioeconomic conditions, for example. This is to diversify risk impact by 
diversifying the portfolio of investment. The entrepreneur may avoid over-
committing to any single project and be ready to exit if a project loses feasibility. 
A portfolio approach would help manage different phases of project 
development and share resources across if one project falls through. 
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Figure 5.3 Strategy for Nascent Industry Project Development 
Second, this study informs project planning by anticipating issues and 
strategizing action. The framew ork of science-justice and stable-emergent 
structures is a toolset that entrepreneurs could use to anticipate what issues are 
expected and to what extent effective regulatory apparatus is available. This 
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assessment informs planning and siting decisions. It also informs strategy, in that 
different kinds of issues require different courses of action. If issues are scientific 
in nature and stable methods are available (e.g. aviation), entrepreneurs' strategy 
may be one of investment in studies for compliance. For highly emerging social 
issues where no method is available for mitigation, the entrepreneurs' strategy 
could instead be one of avoidance and mitigation. The entrepreneurs have the 
most potential for making a difference for those issues that reside in the middle 
of the extremes. That is the "sweet spot" for entrepreneurs to innovate with 
regulators and stakeholders to have issues resolved. 
Third, this study encourages nascent industry firms to form industry 
associations and engage coordinated lobbying efforts to induce the necessary 
legal and scientific innovation. The Cape Wind case reveals that certain issues 
were beyond the scope of a single project, firm, or regulator. Lack of scientific 
standards in key subject matters and lack of formal legal recognition potentially 
paralyze a new industry; yet no single firm has the capacity to drive change of 
this magnitude. Entrepreneurs in the same new industry should pool resources, 
form associations, and coordinate lobbying efforts. The objective is to help 
induce a legal, social, and market environment that is friendly, at least not hostile, 
to the emerging industry. 
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5.3 Limitations and Future Research 
While this study contributes to theory and practice, it also has limitations 
in several areas that could pinpoint to directions for future research. First, this 
study is a single-case study based on extreme sampling. This is consistent with 
the exploratory nature of the study and reflects the objective of proposing new 
theory rather than testing hypotheses. While the theoretical contributions 
generalize well to the findings within the study, they may lack generalizability to 
a wider population of nascent industries. To generalize the findings opens up 
new directions for future research. For instance, future studies could examine 
and compare a larger sample of nascent industries that seek to emerge around 
the same time period. Alternatively, future studies could examine exemplary 
industry emergence cases across different historical contexts. Yet other studies 
could expand to include multiple industries and tease out what factors are 
generic and what factors are more specific to a given industry. 
Second, the data analysis was conducted by a single researcher, the author 
himself. Due to limited resources, multi-person coding of the data was not 
feasible and, for this reason, inter-rater reliability test was not available. Despite 
this limitation, the intent of the data analysis for this exploratory study was to 
189 
identify qualitative patterns and directional trends rather than to seek 
quantitative precision. For future studies, two or three coders could be utilized if 
resources permit and inter-rater reliability test could be conducted to increase the 
precision of the coding exercise. 
Third, the present study relies primarily on archival data, supplemented 
by limited interviews and field observations. This is the author's conscious 
choice as the research objective was to understand the development history of 
the chosen case over a 13-year period. The archival data, available as government 
archives in the public domain, provided a consistent, high-quality source of 
empirical evidence to trace the 13-year evolution. What were missing were the 
personal stories, accounts, and reflections that may have shed light on the 
background of the public record. Those personal accounts may help provide a 
more micro-level explanation to enrich the current, more macro study. In-depth 
interviews and field observations could be a direction of future research to 
expand the current findings. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
This study was originally motivated by the empirical puzzle that, while 
some nascent industries emerged and matured, others have not been as 
successful. While recent institutional studies have made progress m 
understanding industry emergence, we know little about why some nascent 
industries do not emerge. What are the factors and mechanisms that inhibit 
industry emergence? 
To address this question, I studied the case of the Cape Wind project, 
America's first offshore wind energy project proposal. Though it was a single 
project, it was the first firm' first project of a potential, nascent industry. This 
unique nature of the case offered me the opportunity to examine the detailed 
processes by which the first developer interacted with the institutional 
environment when the first mover made the first attempt at market entry. 
Cape Wind's project development spanned a period of 13 years (2001-
2014). It went through a difficult, yet eventually successful, regulatory process. It 
met with strong social resistance as well as significant risks in technology, 
economics, and political climate. As of the writing of this dissertation in mid-
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2014, the project was still in an uncertain stage, with only limited progress in 
securing key business relations with buyers, investors, and suppliers. 
Through the study on Cape Wind, I showed that a systemic interplay of 
regulatory, social, technological, economic, and political factors may delay 
project development and inhibit industry emergence. It is a dynamic, 
multifaceted story of an industry so far failing to emerge. In particular, the 
regulatory process is identified as the primary inhibitor, as in a highly regulated 
sector, a long, unpredictable regulatory lead-time deprived the firm of 
capitalizing on technological and market opportunities when the timing was 
appropriate. Loss of time also meant accumulation of sunk and opportunity costs, 
inducing escalation of commitment and leaving the project in limbo between . 
difficult choices. 
The Cape Wind project also showed that the regulatory regime and the 
public were structurally disengaged in their attention, values, and beliefs when 
they evaluated issues. The regulators tended to focus on scientific issues 
requiring stable methods while the public tended to focus on social justice issues 
requiring emergent methods. This disengagement left the project in a quagmire 
of social contestation despite regulatory approval. 
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This study contributes substantively to economic sociology by revealing 
the systemic interplay of regulatory, social, economic, technological, and political 
as sources of resistance that constitutes the barrier to entry for nascent industry. 
It also demonstrates how the regulatory process, due to the structural 
disengagement between the regulator and the public, in their preferential foci in 
problem-solving values and structures, may constitute a primary inhibitor to 
industry emergence. 
This study contributes to the development of theory in institutional 
studies, innovation, and social movement. Through the dual consideration of 
values and structures, this study emphasizes the role of structure in enabling and 
constraining social action that would translate values into socioeconomic 
outcomes. While identifying the four kinds of resistance that inhibit industry 
emergence, I proposed a framework of four kinds of innovation as ways to 
dismantle the barriers. This study also shows that certain kinds of issues, when 
used strategically, provide more potential for influence by social movement. 
This study is only a beginning to building a holistic understanding of the 
resistance to industry emergence and of the necessary innovation for dismantling 
the barrier. Future research is needed to tease out variations across projects, 
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industries, and country differences. More studies are needed for better 
understanding how divergent stakeholders mobilize their resources in detail. 
On this note, I conclude this dissertation. This is my first formal attempt of 
inquiry into the rich socioeconomic arena where innovation, entrepreneurship, 
regulation, and social movement intersect to construct and shape the world as 
we know it. No study is perfect. This dissertation is my humble effort to join the 
broad conversation that seeks to push the boundaries of what we know. And, 
hopefully, that growing knowledge will lead us to a more prosperous yet fair 
society. 0 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A-1. List of Issues Identified in Hearings 
Issue Number of Cites in Hearings 
ID 
Issues 2002 2004 2008 
#of Cites #of Cites #of Cites 
1 Alternative energy sources 5 6 1 
2 Alternative energy technologies 10 17 17 
3 Alternative locations for consideration 18 28 44 
4 Alternative to fossil fuel 3 25 27 
5 Analysis of alternatives 4 4 3 
6 Benefit- detriment balance 1 27 20 
7 Compensation plan 1 3 
8 Competing environmental causes 2 6 1 
9 Conservation as alternative 3 9 4 
10 Decommission plan 10 11 11 
11 Dependence ongov subsidies 3 5 12 
12 Detriments of fossil fuel 4 19 10 
13 Disruption to military training 1 
14 Economic cost of fossil fuel 1 1 3 
15 Economic justification for the project 6 13 11 
16 Economy of the project 7 6 2 
17 Electromagnetic impact 4 1 3 
18 Energy independence 6 28 7 
19 Environmental justice 10 3 
20 Ethnic Justice 2 
21 European/overseas Experience 11 21 11 
22 Fuel diversity 2 3 
23 Global warming/climate change 4 44 32 
24 Health effects 4 28 
25 Impact on air quality 3 14 4 
26 Impact on avian life 17 29 15 
27 Impact on aviation 5 12 10 
28 Impact on electricity rates 5 14 15 
29 Impact on environment in general 6 12 4 
30 Impact on fisheries 18 22 50 
31 Impact on local economy 6 15 12 
32 Impact on marine environment 9 17 4 
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33 Impact on marine life 14 11 15 
34 Impact on Native American culture 3 
35 Impact on navigation 12 35 29 
36 Impact on property values 4 6 2 
37 Impact on recreational boating 6 3 5 
38 Impact on search and rescue 1 5 
39 Impact on tourism 12 32 21 
40 Impact on water quality 2 
41 Intergenerational justice 4 36 21 
42 Job creation 2 16 6 
43 Job loss 1 6 4 
44 Jurisdictional uncertainty 6 15 2 
45 Justification of chosen location 3 14 
46 Lack of information 7 11 17 
47 Legality of the project 3 2 2 
48 Local benefits 13 12 4 
49 Maintenance plan 1 1 4 
50 Nantucket as treasure/sanctuary 10 21 10 
51 Need for regulation 3 34 21 
52 NIMBYism 2 1 3 
53 Noise 8 4 3 
54 Pilot and experiment 10 9 1 
55 Policy support 2 6 
56 Precedent setting 8 31 16 
57 Procedural readiness 4 13 7 
58 Project scale 1 2 2 
59 Public opposition 4 8 5 
60 Public resources for private enterprise 10 30 13 
61 Quality/neutrality of impact studies 9 44 56 
62 Radar/sonar interference 6 12 
63 Risk of oil spill 21 12 
64 Scope of impact studies 3 
65 Submarine cabling 3 1 
66 Technological maturity 6 4 
67 Technological robustness 3 9 5 
68 Uncertainty & unpredictability 1 5 8 
69 Unique regional resources for 4 14 4 
conservation 
70 Vibration 3 1 
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71 Visual impact 35 58 44 
72 War for oil 19 2 
73 Wind resources 2 3 1 
74 Wind turbines capacity factor 3 1 2 
75 Zoning regulation 2 4 4 
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Appendix A-2 General Industry-Level Milestones 
General Industry-Level Milestones 
Date Event Source Type of Event 
2001-11-22 Cape Wind filed application with USACE draft EIS first application 
USACE. 2004 
2005-01-04 Energy policy act of 2005 established Greentechmedia: federal policy 
federal jurisdiction over offshore offshore wind 
energy on OCS (outer continental moves to full 
shelf), these regulations were not speed ahead 
issued/ adopted until 2009 under (Nov. 24, 2010 by 
Obama Herman Trabish) 
2005-06-30 Governor of MA signed Green Navigant annual act signing 
Communities Act- authorized offshore analysis 
distribution utilities to sign PPAs 
with renewable enei"gy developers 
2007-12-10 Bluewater Wind secured the first US World Wind PPA 
PP A for an offshore wind project off Technology, 
the coast of Delaware, put on hold in 6/26/14 
2012 
2008-09-25 Deepwater Wind announced AWEA 2010 Announcement 
offshore facility in Quonset, RI Annual R~ort 
2009-06-01 NJ: permit status: interim lease for AWEA 2010 Interim Lease 
Fishermen's Energy, LLC;s Offshore Annual Report 
New Jersey Wind farm 
2009-07-01 Texas General Land Office issued 2 AWEA2009 Lease 
offshore leases to Baryonyx annual report 
Corporation 
2009-12-01 The New York Power Authority AWEA2009 RFP 
issued RFP (request for proposals) annual report 
for 500MW offshore wind in Lake 
Erie and/or Lake Ontario 
2010-08-01 Deepwater Wind secured PP A for AWEA2009 PPA 
Block Island Wind Farm annual report 
2010-08-11 Rhode Island Public Utility AWEA 2010 PPA approved 
Commission approved PP A for Annual Report 
Deepwater's Wind Block Island 
Project with National Grid 
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2010-08-19 Has since been cancelled ... AWEA2010 Permit and PPA 
NC: Duke Energy's NC Coastal Annual Report cancelled 
Wind Demonstration Project in 
Eastern Pamlico Sound, permit 
canceled and PP A approved 
Offshore Wind Rider for cost 
recovery 
2010-10-01 Secretary Salazar signed first AWEA 2010 lease signing 
offshore wind lease in US for Cape Annual Report 
Wind 
2011-05-06 NJ: has state permits for Fishermen's AWEA2010 State Permit 
Energy, LLC's offshore Atlantic City Annual Report 
Wind Farm 
2011-12-12 Bluewater Wind withdrew from PP A Navigant annual PP A withdrawal 
secured in 2009 with Delaware offshore analysis 
because of "congressional failure to (2013) 
fund loan guarantees .. " 
2012-11-26 Massachusetts Department of Public AWEA 2010 PP A approved 
Utilities approved Cape Wind PP A Annual Report 
with National Grid 
2012-12-12 DOE announced seven offshore energy.gov DOE Funding 
wind awards 
2013-05-31 Umaine installed a l/8th scale pilot Navigant annual pilot turbine 
floating turbine anchored to offshore analysis 
Penobscot Bay, ME, the VolturnUS 
(1st grid-connected offshore wind 
turbine in US) 
2013-07-31 "BOEM held first-ever competitive Navigant annual lease 
lease sale for renewable energy in offshore analysis 
federal waters south of RI and MA" 
auctioned the north and south leases; 
DeeE_water wind won both for $3.8M 
2013-09-04 BOEM held 2nd competitive lease N avigant annual lease 
sale for commercial lease area offshore analysis 
offshore of VA. Dominion Virginia 
Power won with $1.6M bid. 
2013-10-11 Dominion Virginia Power signed Navigant annual Lease Signing 
lease for Virginia WEA offshore analysis 
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2014-02-14 Deepwater signed installation Navigant annual Installation 
contract with ship-owner Bold Tern, offshore analysis contract 
installation to begin in 3rd quarter of 
2016 (Energy Business Review 2014) 
2014-05-01 DOE announced it would provide USA Today: U.S. federal funding 
federal funds for the design and offshore wind announcement 
construction of Fisherman's Energy power nears 
in NJ, Dominion of VA, and takeoff with 14 
Principle Power off Oregon projects 
2014-05-01 DOE announced continued funding Navigant annual DOE funding 
to ATD (offshore wind advanced offshore analysis 
technology demonstration) 
2014-05-14 Baryonyx Corp cancelled USACE Navigant annual cancelation 
permits for projects off the coast of offshore analysis 
Texas 
2014-07-01 DOE announced conditional $150M N avigant annual DOE loan 
loan guarantee for Cape Wind offshore analysis 
E_roiect 
2014-08-19 "Interior Auctions 80,000 acres U.S. Department lease sale 
Offshore Maryland for Wind Energy of the Interior 
Development" (US Wind Inc. won 
the lease sale for both the North and 
South areas auctioned by BOEM in 
Maryland.) 
2014-09-05 30MW Block Island Project received WindPower federal approval, 
federal approval (Deepwater Wind Offshores awaitBOEM 
received permits for the project 
located off Block Island, RI.) 
2014-09-08 14 US projects are considered in Navigant milestone 
advanced stages analysis 
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